The court emphasizes that the burden of proving sufficient cause for delay lies with the appellant, and mere assertions of negligence by counsel are insufficient to warrant condonation.

JUDGMENT :

G. Satapathy, J.

IA No.379 of 2025 & MACA No.178 of 2025

1. This application in IA No.379 of 2025 by the appellant-petitioner U/S.5 of Limitation Act, 1963 is for condonation of delay of 1142 days in preferring the appeal.

2. Heard, Mr. Himanshu Sekhar Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner and Mr. Rabindra Nath Debata, learned counsel appearing for R1 virtually and perused the record. None appears for R2/OP.2 despite valid service of notice of IA on him.

3. Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant- petitioner, however, by placing the facts as stated in paragraph-4 of the IA No.379 of 2025 submits that since the impugned judgment was passed without the knowledge of the appellant-petitioner, he could not prefer the appeal in time and once he came to know about the passing of the impugned judgment, he has preferred this appeal and, therefore, there is no latches or negligence on the part of the appellant-petitioner, rather the appellant-petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time. Mr. Mishra also alternatively submits that the Opposite Party can be compensated for the delay by imposing some cost on the appellant-petitioner. In summing up his argument, Mr. Mishra, prays to allow the IA by condoning the delay in preferring the appeal.

3.1. On the other hand, Mr. Rabindra Nath Debata, learned counsel appearing virtually for R1, however, strongly opposes the prayer for condonation of delay by contending inter-alia that the certified copy of judgment annexed to the appeal having been made ready on 07.12.2022, the knowledge of the appellant-petitioner can be attributed from the said date and the appellant- petitioner having not explained the cause of delay for around three years, the application for condonation of delay by the appellant-petitioner merits no consideration and may kindly be rejected.

4. After having considered the rival submissions upon perusal of record, it appears that the appellant-petitioner has filed this application in IA No.379 of 2025 for condonation of delay of 1142 days by averring inter- alia the following in paragraph-4 of the IA, which reads as under:-

“4. That on receiving the said notice, he approached and consult Sri Pravat Mohapatra, Advocate, Sambalpur. He handed over the notice executed Vokalatnama and required professional fees to appear for him in the case and to do the needful. He had also given his Mobile number for contact as and when necessary. On receiving the same, the learned Advocate assured him to look after the case and call him as and when necessary and assuring that nothing will happen as he is not the owner of the vehicle.”

5. The aforesaid plea of the appellant-petitioner has been in fact challenged by the Opposite Party by filing objection stating inter-alia therein that the impugned copy of judgment was made ready on 07.12.2022 clearly establishing that the appellant-petitioner had knowledge of the impugned judgment at least from the said date and despite such knowledge, the appellant-petitioner has failed to file the appeal within prescribed period of limitation. Be that as it may, the delay of 1142 days is not a mere delay, rather it is a delay for a substantial period, however, the delay can be condoned provided it is found that the appellant-petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal in time, but in this case, it is the plea of the appellant-petitioner that his advocate did not communicate him about the matter, rather he assured that nothing will happen as he is not the owner of the vehicle. The plea as advanced by the appellant-petitioner is mere an oral assertion, but no document or any material has been produced to indicate that the said advocate did not commun