JUDGMENT :

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

1. The plaintiff/appellant is the father of the defendant/respondent.

2. The present appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant for the following reliefs:

(a) That a decree of declaration be passed declaring that the aforesaid deed of gift being No. I-355 of the year 2006 of the office of the ADSR, Asansol is void as has been obtained by the Defendant by practicing fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation upon the plaintiff.

(b) That a further decree of declaration be passed declaring that the said deed of gift being No. I-355 for the year 2006 of the office of the Additional District Sub-Registrar, Raniganj is void ab-initio, no nest and the same is to be cancelled.

(c) That a decree of permanent injunction be passed restraining the defendant & his men, agents, employees, executors from transferring, alienating the suit property and from changing the nature and character of the same.

(d) A copy of the decree be sent to the Additional District Sub-Registrar, Raniganj to expunge the instrument being No. I-355 of the year 2006 of the Additional District Sub-Registrar, Raniganj.

(e) that a decree for cost of the suit.

(f) That any other or further relief and/or reliefs to which the plaintiff is entitled to get be also passed.

3. By the impugned deemed decree, the plaint of the said suit was rejected on an application filed by the defendant/respondent under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”), inter alia on the ground that the suit was ex facie barred by limitation and the cause of action was illusory and vexatious, in view of suppression of material facts.

4. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant argues that, while adjudicating an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the court has to look only at the plaint pleadings and not any extraneous document. As per the pleadings of the plaint, it is argued, the plaintiff came to know for the first time that a lease deed intended to be executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant on January 19, 2006 had been surreptitiously converted to a deed of gift, only on February 24, 2022, when the defendant/respondent and his in-laws' family, accompanied by anti-social elements, came to the suit property to oust the plaintiff/appellant and disclosed about such purported deed. The suit was instituted soon thereafter, in the month of April, 2022 itself and is, thus, well within time.

5. It is argued that the learned Trial Judge proceeded on the premise that the factum of subsequent execution of another lease deed by the plaintiff, as alleged by the defendant, was suppressed in the plaint. Such fact was construed by the learned Trial Judge to be material, non-disclosure of which vitiated the suit itself. However, it is argued that the said lease deed is in respect of a different property than the suit property and is unconnected with the cause of action of the present suit and, at best, can be relied on by the defendant during trial. Thus, it was premature for the learned Trial Judge to reject the plaint on the basis of such unconnected lease deed, which is not even material for the purpose of the suit, as framed.

6. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned deemed decree ought to be set aside.

7. Learned counsel for the defendant/respondent submits that the execution of a subsequent lease deed by the plaintiff himself in favour of the defendant/respondent was germane for adjudication of the suit. Thus, suppression of such fact was rightly construed by the learned Trial Judge to be vexatious, rendering the cause of action illusory.

8. It is submitted that the plaintiff's intention to execute a lease deed on January 19, 2006 in respect of the dwelling house of the plaintiff where the plaintiff stayed, as alleged in the plaint, would be absurd. Moreover, the size of the suit property, which is a residential premise, is small and not viable for commercial exploitation by