Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. The Plaintiff in a suit claimed eligible to exclusion of time in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963; for short 'the Limitation Act'. The trial Court took up the application specifically filed invoking the said provision and held that the prior proceedings on the basis of which benefit of exclusion of time was claimed, was decided on merits and not for want of or defect in jurisdiction. The Court below proceeded to hold that the earlier proceedings were decided on merits and therefore, the Plaintiff is not entitled to maintain the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Holding so, the said application was dismissed and consequentially, the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; hereinafter called 'the CP Code'. That is under challenge.

2. Assailing the impugned order, the learned counsel for the Appellant argued that the question whether the prior proceedings in writ jurisdiction before the Madhya Pradesh High Court and before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition arising therefrom, are civil proceedings in relation to the same matter in issue, is by itself a question that ought to have been determined at trial of the suit and that the plea whether the prosecution of such earlier proceedings were with due diligence and in good faith are also matters to be considered at trial and not in summary manner, as has been done by the Court below. Elaborating on the various aspects of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, learned counsel made reference to the judgments of the Apex Court in C. Venkat Swamy v. H.N.Shivanna; AIR 2017 SC 5604, Suryachakra Power Corporation Ltd. v. Electricity Department; (2016) 16 SCC 152, M.P.Housing Board v. Mohanlal & Company; (2016) 14 SCC 199, Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta; (2010) 10 SCC 141, Union of India v. West Coast Paper Mills Ltd.; (2004) 2 SCC 747, and that of the Calcutta High Court in Basdeo Prasad Khemka v. Union of India; AIR 1978 Cal 100.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondents No. 1 and 2 supported the impugned order.

4. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. Sub-section 1 of that Act reads as follows:

“(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”

5. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Irrigation Department; (2008) 7 SCC 169, the Hon'ble Supreme Court delineated the conditions in which Section 14 of the Limitation Act will be application. The five conditions enumerated therein, on the basis of clear terms of Section 14, are as follows :

“(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;

(2) The prior proceedings had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;

(3) The failure of the prior proceedings was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;

(4) The earlier proceedings and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and;

(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.”

It was also held in that case as follows :

22....While considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. In fact, the section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. On re