ORDER :

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

1. The petitioners are convicts and undergoing sentences for commission of offence in Central Jail, Bilaspur and they were admitted to the privilege of parole in accordance with the Chhattisgarh Prisoner’s Leave Rules, 1989 (for short “the Rules of 1989”) on 29.03.2020 and they were required to surrender on 22.04.2020, on completion of their period of parole, however, in the meanwhile, corona pandemic stepped in and the period of parole was extended by the order of this Court passed in W.P. (PIL) No.27/2020. During the extended period of parole, the respondent No.6 herein Keshav Prasad Rathor filed W.P.(CR) No.488/2020 before this Court seeking cancellation of parole granted to the petitioners herein, which petition was disposed off by this Court giving liberty to the said respondent to move an application for cancellation of parole before the concerned District Magistrate and the concerned District Magistrate was directed to consider the application in accordance with law by order dated 04.11.2020 and accordingly, the application for cancellation of parole was filed by the petitioner therein before the District Magistrate, Gourela-Pendra-Marwahi, respondent No.3 herein and by the impugned order dated 26.11.2020, the parole granted to the petitioners herein was cancelled and the petitioners were sent to Jail in accordance with Sections 31-A(8) and 31-E(2)(e) of the Prisoners Act, 1900 [as amended by the Prisoners (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1985].

2. The aforesaid impugned order dated 26.11.2020 has been called in question in the instant writ petition and the respondent officers as well as private respondent both have filed returns opposing the writ petition to which the petitioners have also filed rejoinder.

3. Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that by the impugned order, the petitioners have been deprived of the benefit of privilege to be admitted on parole for the remaining period of sentence, which is punitive in nature, therefore, reasonable opportunity of hearing ought to have been granted to the petitioners and in that view of the matter, it is liable to be set aside.

4. Mr. Afroz Khan, learned State counsel would submit that the petitioners have violated the conditions of order by which they were granted leave and therefore, Section 31-A(8) has rightly been exercised by the learned District Magistrate, which has been done after seeking report of the Superintendent of Police and concerned S.H.O. Pendra and statement of the respondent No.6 and other villagers have been recorded and thereafter the impugned order is strictly in accordance with law.

5. Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the respondent No.6 would adopt the stand taken by the State/ respondents No.1 to 5.

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection.

7. It is correct to say that the petitioners were admitted to the privilege of parole in accordance with the Rules of 1989 and they were required to surrender on 22.04.2020, but, in the meanwhile in view of Corona pandemic situation and pursuant to the order passed in W.P.(PIL) No.27/2020, their period of parole was extended from time to time and during the continuance of their parole, complaint was made by the respondent No.6 and in the writ petition filed before this Court, direction was made to the District Magistrate to look into the grievance of the respondent No.6 herein and in turn, the impugned order has been passed forfeiting their right to be enlarged on parole during remaining period of sentence, which has been challenged in this writ petition.

8. A careful perusal of the impugned order would show that two petitioners were found guilty of abusing the complainant/respondent No.6 and further found that the commission of cognizable offence is very likely and therefore in exercise of Section 31-A(8) and 31-E(2)(e) of the P