2023 Supreme(Chh) 217
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
P. SAM KOSHY, J.
Shri Ravi Meghani S/o Late Kishan Chand – Appellant
Versus
Aditya Birla Housing Finance Ltd – Respondents
WPC No. 1660 of 2023
Decided on : 10-04-2023
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant :Mr. Vivek Mishra, Advocate
For the Respondent:Mr. Aman Kesharwani, Mr. Ankit Pandey, Advocate
Headnote:
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 - Section 14, 18 - Private financial institution - Grant interim protection to pay an amount - Challenge in writ petition is to order passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal in Securitization Application - Held, No governmental agency or officer is connected with affairs of appellant bank nor anyone of them is a member of Board of Directors - In normal functioning of private banking company there is no participation or interference of State or its authorities - Decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court so far as maintainability of writ petition against private banks/financial institutions, writ petition in its present form would not be maintainable - Second ground on which Court is not inclined to entertain petition is that there is a remedy of statutory appeal available to petitioner under Section 18 of Sarfaesi Act which provides for an appeal arising out of order of DRT - Court is not inclined to entertain writ petition - Petition rejected.
JUDGMENT :
1. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jabalpur in Securitization Application No.704 of 2022.
2. Vide the impugned order, the Debt Recovery Tribunal has granted interim protection to the petitioner directing the applicant to pay an amount of Rs.20 Lakhs within a period of 2 months, of which 10 Lakh has to be paid by 10.04.2023 and remaining 10 Lakh has to be paid by 10.05.2023. Subject to the petitioner depositing the said 20 Lakh rupees by 10.05.2023, the DRT has ordered for stay of the effect and operation of the order passed by the District Magistrate, Raipur dated 18.07.2022 under Section 14 of the Sarfaesi Act.
3. At this juncture, this Court is of the opinion that writ petition itself would not be maintainable for more than one reasons. Firstly, on the ground that petition is against a private financial institution i.e. respondent no.1.
4. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent past in the case of Phoenix Arc Private Limited Vs. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir & Others, (2022) 5 SCC 345 in paragraph 18, 20 & 21 has held as under :-
18. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ petition against the private financial institution – ARC – appellant herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the proposed action/actions under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act can be said to be not maintainable. In the present case, the ARC proposed to take action/actions under the SARFAESI Act to recover the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The ARC as such cannot be said to be performing public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. During the course of a commercial transaction and under the contract, the bank/ARC lent the money to the borrowers herein and therefore the said activity of the bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing a public function which is normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable. Therefore, decisions of this Court in the cases of Praga Tools Corporation (supra) and Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel 3 appearing on behalf of the borrowers are not of any assistance to the borrowers.
20. In the case of Mathew K.C. (supra) after referring to and/or considering the decision of this Court in the case of Chhabil Dass Agarwal (supra), it was observed and held in paragraph 5 as under:-
“5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is loath to interfere with an interim order passed in a pending proceeding before the High Court, except in special circumstances, to prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the court. In the present case, the facts are not in dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603, as follows: (SCC p. 611, para 15)
“15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles