ORDER :

1. Aggrieved by the Order dated 6.2.2023 (Annexure P-1) passed by Respondent No.2, the Regional Transport Authority, the present Writ Petition has been filed by the Petitioner.

2. Vide the impugned Order, the Authority concerned has rejected the application of the Petitioner seeking for permit on the route Kansbahara to Manendragarh via Ushad, Barour, Marvahi, Danikundi, Sakda, Jaroundha, Devadand, Koda with 2 return trips daily.

3. The impugned Order would reveal that the application of the Petitioner has been rejected, primarily, on three grounds. The first two grounds being that of there being a clash of timing with the other operators and the third ground being that of the permit sought for is one which is in respect of three terminals, which is otherwise not permissible under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the MV Act').

4. Assailing the impugned Order, learned Counsel for Petitioner submits that the impugned Order so far as the first and second grounds are concerned, the same is hit by the provisions of Sections 71 and 80 of the MV Act. According to the Petitioner, before rejecting the application of the Petitioner, the concerned Authority has not given an opportunity to the Petitioner for revising the time schedule so as to avoid time clash with the other operators, which is otherwise requirement of law. Learned Counsel for Petitioner, in this regard, refers to the Judgment of this High Court passed on 18.2.2022 in W.P.(C) No.890/2022 (Sanjay Singh Vs. Regional Transport Authority).

5. As regards the third ground, learned Counsel for Petitioner submits that the analogy applied by the Authority concerned while rejecting the application on the ground that the permit sought for is one which has three terminals, would not be applicable in the instant case for the reason that the route for which the permission has been sought for is on the same highway. That, in between the return trip, the Petitioner intends to operate the Bus from Manendragrah to Sakda which is a short duration trip on the same highway. Thus, the three terminals principle should not be applied in the instant case and the impugned Order therefore also needs to be interfered with.

6. Learned State Counsel, per contra, submits that so far as the ground of three terminals is concerned, the said finding of the Authority is squarely covered by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in "AIR 1999 MP 1" in the matter of "Vivek Tejnarain Dwivedi & Anr. v. Prem Narain & Ors." [LPA No.73/1998] where in an identical set of facts the Division Bench has held that such permit cannot be granted even if it falls on the same highway. It would still amount to three terminals which otherwise is not permissible.

7. As regards the first and second grounds, learned State Counsel submits that upon due perusal of the timing that the Petitioner has sought for, it was found that it was in clash with the other operators on the said route. Therefore, since there was a clash in the route, the application was rightly rejected. So far as rescheduling is concerned, learned State Counsel submits that the Petitioner would always be free to move fresh application for grant of fresh permit on the basis of new time schedule and, therefore, the impugned Order does not warrant any interference.

8. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, it would be relevant at this juncture to take note of the issue of three terminals. Dealing with the said issue, it would also be pertinent to take note of the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in "Vivek Tejnarain Dwivedi" (supra) where in Paragraphs 25 to 28 it has been held as under:-

"25. The route is an essential ingredient of a permit authorising the plying of motor vehicles on a public highway It is an-abstract concept of line of travel between one terminus and another and is not the same thing as a physical tract between two termii. It is of the essence of a ro