The main legal point established in the judgment is the statutory nature of the determination of compensation in motor accident claims, emphasizing the standard of proof, summary procedure, and the tribunal's role in the process.

ORDER :

1. This is an appeal for enhancement of compensation preferred against the impugned award dated 28.02.2017 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Katghora, District Korba in Claim Case No. 28/2015 in connection with the death of Ramavtar Sahu in a road accident.

2. The claimants herein are the widow and minor children of the deceased. The accident is said to have occurred on account of the rash and negligent act of respondent No. 1 the driver of offending vehicle i.e. Tractor bearing registration No. CG-04-DA-4520 and Trolley No. CG-04-DM-2480. Deceased is pleaded to have been aged about 35 years at the relevant time earning Rs. 12,000/- per month by doing a private job. The compensation claimed was Rs. 1,10,00,000/-.

3. Learned Tribunal however dismissed the claim of the claimants inter-alia holding that the claimants have not been able to prove that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driver of the offending vehicle by its driver. Hence this appeal.

4. Counsel for the appellants/claimants submits that the accident took place on 23.04.2015; Dehati Nalisi was recorded on the same day and the FIR was registered on 24.04.2015. He submits that the post mortem examination on the body of the deceased was conducted and the post mortem report shows that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock due to road traffic accident (RTA), and the nature of death was accidental. Though one eye-witness to the accident namely Roop Singh is said to be there, from his cross examination it is apparent that at the time accident he was at home and did not see the accident, and for that learned Tribunal disbelieved the occurrence from the offending vehicle. Counsel for the appellants submits that the proceedings under the Motor Vehicle Act are summary ones and therefore strict compliance of the Evidence Act is not necessary. According to the counsel for the appellants, from the Dehati Nalisi, FIR and PM report, the accident from the offending vehicle is very much established and therefore the finding of the Tribunal rejecting the claim is absolutely perverse and needs to be set aside.

5. Counsel for the respondents, in particular counsel for the insurance company supports the impugned award and submits that the driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid and effective driving licence and thus there is violation of the Insurance policy, and that only the tractor was insured and not the trolley, and therefore the insurance cannot be held liable to pay compensation.

6. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

7. While dealing with an identical question in the matter of Bimla Devi and Others vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Others, (2009) 13 SCC 530 it has been held by the Supreme Court as under:

“15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties.”

8. In the matter of United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Shila Datta and Others, (2011) 10 SCC 509 it has been held under:

“10. A claim petition for compensation in regard to a motor accident (filed by the injured or in case of death, by the dependant family members) before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under section 165 of the Act is neither a suit nor an adversarial lis in the traditional sense. It is a proceedings in terms of and regulated by the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act which is a complete Code in itself. We may in this context refer to the following significant aspects in regard to the Tribun