The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the provisions under Section 163-A and Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, emphasizing the distinction between the two sections, the annual income cap under Section 163-A, and the purposeful construction of the statute to provide social security benefits.

ORDER :

The present appeal has been preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, (for short “MV Act”) 1988 against the impugned award dated 19.09.2017 passed in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 25/2016 by the First Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Manendragarh, District Koriya.

2. The claim petition preferred by the claimants under Section 163-A of the MV Act alleging inter alia that on the date of accident i.e. 19.01.2015, the deceased was sitting besides the respondent No.1/driver of the offending vehicle truck bearing registration No. CG 15 AC 5300 and the respondent No.1 by rash and negligent driving caused the accident as a result of which he sustained injury on the head and subsequently died during treatment.

3. Learned counsel for the appellants/claimants submits that deceased was earning Rs. 10,000/- per month and upon calculating the yearly income, taking the above mentioned amount, it would come to more than Rs. 40,000/- (i.e. Rs. 1,20,000/- per annum). The Tribunal on the basis of the provisions under Section 163-A of the MV Act has erred in dismissing the claim petition. He further submits that the learned Tribunal ought to have decided the claim petition under Section 166 of the MV Act.

4. To this, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance company submits that the claimants had pleaded the income of the deceased as Rs. 10,000/- per month (Rs. 1,20,000/- per annum) which is more than the upper cap of Rs. 40,000/- prescribed in the Second Schedule under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimant’s claim petition filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, itself was not maintainable. Reliance has been placed on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni Vs. United Insurance Company Ltd. Baroda (2004) 5 SCC 385 which has also been relied upon by the Division Bench of this Court in Misc. Appeal No. 216 of 2006 (Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Swatantra Kumar Verma and Others), in Misc. Appeal No. 706 of 2014 (Smt. Sunita Gupta Vs. Gurusharan and Others) and Miscellaneous Appeal No. 1122 of 2005 (Smt. Kala Bai Vs. Rajendra Jain).

5. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

6. The question before this Court is as to whether annual income of the deceased is more than Rs. 40,000/- and the same is maintainable under Section 163-A of the M.V.Act in the present form?

7. From perusal of the pleadings, it appears that the deceased was working as a driver and was earning Rs. 10,000/- per month which clearly shows that he was earning Rs. 1,20,000/- per annum. Therefore as per the assessment of the Tribunal, deceased was earning more than Rs. 40,000/- yearly. In the case of Deepal Gishihbhai Soni (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the provision for getting compensation under Section 163-A of the Act is totally different from Section 166 of the Act. When a petitioner files a claim petition under Section 166 of the Act, he is required to prove negligence, but under Section 163-A of the Act, no negligence is required to be proved and it amounts to no fault liability. It has been held by the Supreme Court as follows:

“67. We therefore, are of the opinion that Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hansrajbhai Vs. Kodala (2001) 5 SCC 175 has correctly been decided. However, we do not agree with the findings in Kodala that if a person invokes provisions of Section 163-A, the annual income of Rs. 40,000/- per annum shall be treated as a cap. In our opinion, the proceeding under Section 163- A being a social security provision, providing for a distinct scheme only those whose annual income is upto Rs. 40,000/- can take benefit thereof. All other claims are required to be determined in terms of Chapter XII of the Act.”

8. It was further observed that where such beneficial legislation has a scheme of its own and there is no vagueness or doubt therein, the Court should not expand the scope of the Statute on the pretext of extend