The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of adhering to the principles of natural justice, particularly in decisions pertaining to blacklisting, which entail grave consequences for the entity being blacklisted.

ORDER :

1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the legality and sustainability of the order dated 19.05.2023 passed by respondent No.3 for forfeiting the amount of Rs.30,000/- deposited against the contract of transportation of group No.07, 08, group No.14, 17, group No.07, 09, group No. 07, 13, 16, 09 for non-performance of contract of transportation of woods, recovery of 33 ½ percent towards excess expenditure to be incurred with blacklisting and banning the petitioner for a period of 3 years from the date of order.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is working as Contractor and transporting timber and wood for last two decades. Petitioner was awarded contract for transportation of woods, by the Divisional Forest Officer, Gariyaband. Impugned order was issued on 22.12.2022, 24.01.2023, 30.01.2023 and 21.02.2023. Petitioner started work of transportation of woods from the specified area/work place, however, the sufficient quantity of timber and woods were not available for transportation and further due to untimely rain, road provided by the respondents became non-transportable. Petitioner, on several occasions, wrote letter bringing to the notice of respondents about the difficulties being faced in transporting the woods/timber at the required pace, but they have not given any heed to the request made by the petitioner. Respondents without giving any opportunity of hearing, in an arbitrary manner, have passed the impugned order. He also pointed out that the letter/notice which was issued to the petitioner on 12.05.2023 and 17.05.2023 clearly mentioned the cutoff date for completing the transportation work as 25.05.2023, however, prior to the said date, impugned order is passed on 19.05.2023 and therefore the order impugned is bad in law.

3. Learned counsel for the respondent- State vehemently opposes the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that time and again petitioner was issued letter requesting to complete the work of transportation within the time as agreed in the contract between the parties. In the letter/notice, petitioner was brought to the notice that his work of transportation is slow. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that timber and wood for transportation was not available is not correct, in view of Annexure P-6 and Annexure P-7, which are letters written to the petitioner by the Divisional Forest Officer, Gariyaband on 12.05.2023 and 17.05.2023. There is no error on the part of respondents in passing the impugned order. He also contended that writ petition itself is not maintainable in view of efficacious alternate remedy of arbitration as per Clause 20 of the Agreement for Haulage of Fuel Wood to Forest Depot. Prior to taking action against the petitioner, two detailed notices were issued on 12.05.2023 and 17.05.2023 mentioning the shortcomings and granting time to complete the quantity of transportation of woods/timber and the consequences of non-completion of contract is also mentioned therein. Therefore, impugned order does not call for any interference.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the documents annexed along with writ petition.

5. It is not in dispute that petitioner was awarded the work order on different dates for transportation of woods and timbers, of quantity mentioned therein. The documents further reflect that the petitioner also wrote letter showing difficulty being faced by him and further the letter written by an officer of respondent department that petitioner's work is not up to the mark and satisfactory. Order impugned is with respect to forfeiture of deposit made by the petitioner against the award of work, recovery of the excess expenditure to be incurred at the rate of 33 ½ per cent and the second limb is of blacklisting of the petitioner.

6. So far as the first limb with respect to forfeiture of deposit and recovery of 33 ½ percent of the sanctioned amount is conc