( 1 ). It is the plea of the Petitioner that since the Inquiry has been delayed for a considerable period, because of the slovenly manner in which it had been started and conducted by the DDA, his valuable and infrangible rights for a speedy trial have been thrown to the winds. It is his contentions that on this short ground the charges levelled against him should be quashed. This question has been considered not only by various High Courts but also by the Hon ble Supreme court in a number of cases. By way of preface, the preponderance of opinion is that delay defeats justice and unless the accused is himself the cause of the delay, or the charges are of heinous nature, the inquiry should be brought to an abrupt end.

( 2 ). In Union of India and another vs. Ashok kacker, 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 180 the Petitioner had impugned the charge sheet without even replying to it. It was clearly in these circumstances that the Hon ble supreme Court held that the challenge before the tribunal was premature. The case is thus of little relevance.

( 3 ). In Rajinder Kumar Chopra vs. Food corporation of India and Others, 1998 Lab. I. C. 2508 and in P. P. Sachdava and othars vs. Food Corporation of India, New Delhi and others, 2000 Lab. I. C. 2040, two Division Benches of the Punjab and Haryana High court (both Judgments authored by G. S. Singhvi J.) applied the observations of the Full Bench of that Court in Dr. Ishar Singh vs. State of Punjab (1993 Lab. I. C. 1256) that "delay by itself is no ground to quash the proceedings. Speedy Trial is no doubt a part of the right to be treated reasonably, fairly and justly, but at the same time mere delay by itself does not entitle the delinquent officer to escape the trial. " The Bench thereafter observed that "prima facie the charges were serious and it was impossible for the Court to nullify the proceedings of enquiry by assuming that the defence of the Petitioner will necessarily be prejudiced due to the time gap between the date of the incident and the initiation of the enquiry. " However, the Full Bench had in Ishar Singh s case (supra) itself observed that "there must be a bona fide and reasonable explanation for delay, absence of which would entitle the Court to intervene and examine the case. " The Full Bench did not favour the view that the burden of proving prejudice to the defence lay entirely on the delinquent officer. The gravamen of the assault of the Petitioner in that case appears to be that the enquiry was initiated only on his retirement and after 100% pension had been sanctioned. This is evident from the ultimate paragraph of the judgment. The conclusions of the Full Bench were:

(I) The Government has no right to withhold or postpone pension or the payment on account of commutation of pension. The State is bound to release 100 per cent pension at the time of superannuation, may be provisionally. (ii) The Government can withhold the gratuity or other retiral benefits except pension or postpone payment of the same during pendency of an enquiry. (iii) Pension cannot be adversely affected before a finding of guilt is returned. (iv) The Government can initiate departmental enquiry after long lapse before retirement, rather there is no limitation for iniitiating the departmental enquiry from the date of incident before retirement. The delay and the explanation for the same may reasonably be taken note of keeping in view its likelihood to cause prejudice to the delinquent if the enquiry is challenged in appropriate proceedings. (v) The enquiry proceedings cannot be quashed solely on the ground of long pendency. (vi) There is no effect of superannuation on the pendency of the enquiry proceedings. (vii) The recovery of the government dues can be made from gratuity or other retiral benefits only. "

( 4 ). In S. K. Sharma vs. State Bank of Patiala, 1996 (3) SCC 364, the decision of the Trial Court was in favour of the delinquent officer on the ground that he had not been supplied with