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2002 Supreme(Del) 734
High Court Of Delhi
RANJIT SINGH,EX.SEPOY - Appellant
Versus
UNION OF INDIA - Respondent
Decided On : 05/18/2002
The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of strict compliance with statutory conditions for Court Martial proceedings and the need for a Judge Advocate holding a particular rank.
Headnote:
Court Martial - Army Act, 1950 - Section 113, Section 125, Rule 39, Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 102 - The judgment discusses the scope and limitation of Court Martial proceedings under the Army Act, 1950 and The Army Rules, 1954. It highlights the eligibility and disqualification of officers for Court Martial, the composition of General Court Martial, inquiry by court as to legal constitution, and disqualification of judge-advocate. The judgment emphasizes the importance of a Judge Advocate holding a particular rank and the need for strict compliance with statutory conditions.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner was accused of a serious charge of rape and murder and was tried in a Court Martial. The petitioner raised contentions regarding the eligibility of the Judge Advocate, the obligation of the State to provide a competent counsel at its expenses, and the jurisdiction of the Court Martial. The petitioner also contended that the trial was without jurisdiction due to the ineligibility of the Judge Advocate and the lack of a competent counsel.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the Judge Advocate was ineligible, and the Court Martial proceedings were vitiated. The Court also found that the petitioner was prejudiced due to the lack of a competent counsel and that his fundamental and statutory rights were violated.
Issues: The issues raised in the case included the eligibility of the Judge Advocate, the obligation of the State to provide a competent counsel, and the jurisdiction of the Court Martial.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the Judge Advocate being ineligible, the Court Martial proceedings stood vitiated. The Court also held that the petitioner's fundamental and statutory rights were violated due to the lack of a competent counsel. The Court emphasized the need for strict compliance with statutory conditions and the importance of a Judge Advocate holding a particular rank.
Final Decision: The impugned order was set aside, and the respondents were directed to take appropriate action in accordance with law. The writ petition was allowed with observations and directions made, and the petitioner was entitled to costs.
( 1 ) THE scope and limitation of Court Martial proceedings envisaged under the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 ( hereinafter referred to as the Act ) and The Army Rules, 1954 ( hereinafter referred to as the Rules ) framed thereunder is in question in this writ petition, which arises out of a judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner on 23. 03. 1993.
( 2 ) THE petitioner was accused of a serious charge. A complaint was made against him by a few ladies that on 15. 05. 1992 he committed an offence of rape on one lady. He was put under arrest on the same day. He was released on 18. 05. 1992 as no F. I. R. was lodged. The petitioner allegedly shot at Major Gaikawad on 20. 05. 1992, who had arrested the petitioner. A charge-sheet under Section 302 of the indian Penal Code ( hereinafter referred to as the IPC ) was filed against him on 30. 01. 1993 and a Court Martial for the purpose of his trial was convened on 17. 02. 1993.
( 3 ) A sentence of imprisonment of life coupled with dismissal from service was passed on 23. 03. 1993. A pre-confirmation application filed before the competent authority by him was rejected. Even a post-confirmation petition was rejected by the Government of India vide an Order dated 22. 04. 1994.
( 4 ) THE petitioner thereafter filed a writ petition before the punjab and Haryana High Court, which was withdrawn with a liberty to file writ petition before this Court.
( 5 ) MR. R. S. Randhawa, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner keeping in view the limited jurisdiction of this Court has raised three contentions in support of the present writ petition.
( 6 ) THE learned counsel would firstly contend that the Judge advocate, who has a vital role to play in Court Martial proceedings, being not competent, the entire proceedings were vitiated in law. It was argued that the qualification of a Judge Advocate having regard to Rules 39 and 40 of the Rules and Section 113 of the Act must be taken into consideration in terms whereof 3 years of Commission is a pre-requisite for participating in Court Martial proceedings. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on Union of India and Anr. v. Charanjit S. Gill and Ors. JT 2000 (5) SC 135.
( 7 ) THE learned counsel would next contend that the State had an obligation to provide a counsel at its expenses. Such counsel, keeping in view the gravity of the offence must not only be a competent counsel, but also a counsel who would be in a position to communicate with and take instructions from the accused. The learned counsel would urge that the petitioner did not know Hindi, English or Assamees and as he was conversant with the Punjabi language only, he could not communicate with his counsel and thus, he was seriously prejudiced in the matter of conduct of trial. The learned counsel would submit that as the petitioner was not provided with a counsel of his own choice, his fundamental right under Article 21 was violated. He filed an application as regards engagement of his counsel that the decision be awaited till his family members come, but without passing any order thereon the trial proceeded. It was pointed out that whereas at one point of time, the petitioner was asked to engage his counsel and the State declined to bear expenses, but only at a later stage, by an Order dated 30. 01. 1993, he was informed that a counsel shall be provided to him, wherefor payment of fees shall be restricted to the maximum of Rs. 250. 00 per day for the days, the counsel appeared in the General Court Martial Proceeding. It was, therefore, submitted that even a defence counsel of proven ability was not engaged to appear on his behalf. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Ranchod mathur v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1974 SC 1143: Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, AIR 1979 SC 1369; and Suk Das and Anr. v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 991.
