( 51 ) IT was thus contended that decency or morality is specifically provided for in the said article and in fact morality was a much wider term than decency. Similarly defamation was also provided for in the said Article and there could be no public interest in making defamatory statements. Balance between the protection of personal information and the competing right to free speech must be made. Such personal information, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, would include those facts, communications or opinions that relate to the individual and which are of such a nature that it would be reasonable to accept and regard them as intimate or sensitive and, therefore, to want to withhold or at least to restrict their collection, use or circulation. The learned counsel stated that words used in the extract such. as "amorous" have a very negative meaning and referred to the commentary of Webster's New Dictionary and Thesaurus where "amorous" is defined "fond of making love; full of love; of sexual life". Similarly in the shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd Edition volume 1 "amorous" has been defined as "habitually inclined to love; and have or pertaining to (sexual) life. "

( 52 ) THE learned counsel contended that right of privacy have been guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution of India and it imposed an obligation on the society and the press to protect such rights and other than the exceptions provided for under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution of India, the rights to such privacy cannot be violated. In such a situation, it was contended, that damages in lieu of injunction is not a remedy. It is only when grant of an injunction would be oppressive, a substitute of damages can be a valid substitute. Damages would thus be only remedy if it was capable of being estimated in money which can be adequately compensated by small amount of money and thus it was stated that no amount of money can compensate in cases of repeated defamatory statements. It was contended that such an injunction would arrest the mischief and protect the appellants from possibly avoidable damages. It was thus contended that in such a situation even if justification was pleaded, the same was not available as a defence when the rights of the plaintiff were based on privacy. Justification was, as observed before, entitled only if it was a true, a fair comment and was in public interest. The plea of prior publication was also sought to be repelled on the basis that the same were not public documents within the meaning of section 74 of the evidence Act and one had to look to the Indian Constitution which was different from the first amendment to the U. S. Constitution. (S Rangarajan Vs. P Jagjivan Ram and Ors (1989) 2 scc 574 ).

( 53 ) MR. Sundaram, learned counsel for the appellant in his rejoinder sought to repel the contention of Mr. Panjwani in so far as the right of privacy was concerned as he contended that the same was available only against the State and all the cases in that behalf were in respect to the protection provided from action by the State. It was contended that justification or claim of truth was an absolute defence and there was no right of privacy available to individual in such a situation.

( 54 ) MR. Sundaram further contended that even a reference to the case of S. Rajgopal's would show that the Supreme Court had clearly stated that the position would be very different if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy. In this case, it was contended, the respondent herself had been responsible for the publicity in the press at an earlier stage and it was not open for people to unveil the cloak of privacy to later cloak themselves when it so suited them. Mr. Sundaram, learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that Supreme Court in R Rajgopal's case (Supra) had observed that in case of violation of right of privacy the remedy is - "liable in action fo

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