Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act attracts the Limitation Act by way of analogy only when there is a limitation prescribed in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. It is not correct that the applicability of Limitation Act by virtue of Section 29(2) of the said Act further postulates that an application under the special law should necessarily be made to a court.

( 1 ) THIS is a Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the learned single Judge dated 31. 5. 1974 which he allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 1 and remitted the matter back to the Lt. Governor for decision in accordance with law.

( 2 ). The property bearing No. 48-G, Nizamuddin West, New Delhi was put to auction by the Collector, Delhi on 17. 11. 1971 and was purchased by the appellant for a sum of Rs. 47,000. 00. The auction had taken place in order to realise a sum of money cue to Rehabilitation, Finance Administration from M/s. Shahakar Ltd. on account of loan taken by it for which the son of respondent No. 1 had stood as one of the sureties. The sale was confirmed by the Lt. Governor on 23. 12. 1971. The possession of the property was given to the appellant/auction purchaser on 4. 1. 1972.

( 3 ). On 19. 2. 1972 the respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 91 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (as applied to Delhi) for setting aside the sale. Section 91 provides for making an application to set aside a sale at any time within 30 days from the date of the sale. The plea of the Respondent No. 1 was that she had come to know of sale only on 9. 2. 1972 and therefore there was sufficient reason for the Lt. Governor to condone the delay and entertain the application. She had sought to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 17 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (to be called the Act) for this purpose. The Lt. Governor however, took the view that Limitation Act was not applicable to such an application before him and therefore he had no power to condone the delay, even if the delay was sufficiently explained. The learned Judge however) has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 was applicable and there was power to admit the application after the period prescribed under Section 91 and he therefore by the impugned order remitted the matter back to the Lt. Governor for consideration on merits. The auction purchaser being aggrieved has filed this appeal. The respondent No. 1 invoked Section 5 of the Limitation Act, by virtue of Limitation Act 1963 being applicable to these proceedings because of Section 29 (2) of Limitation Act) which reads as under:

" Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period where the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. "

( 4 ). The learned Judge has accepted this contention which is challenged by Mr. Sanghi the learned counsel for the appellant. He contends that before the Limitation Act can be applicable to any period prescribed by a special act like the Punjab Land Revenue Act two conditions have to be satisfied namely- (1) that there has to be found in the first schedule to the Limitation Act a period prescribed different from the period of limitation prescribed by the special law for an identical application. The contention, in short is that as in the Schedule to the Limitation Act there is no provision for limitation for filing an application before the Commissioner (in this case the Lt. Governor) under Section 91 of the Act. Section 29 (2) cannot attract the Limitation Act because the condition precedent is that there must be found in the schedule the very situation which is to be found in a special law with the only difference that the periods of limitation may be different. This argument proceeds on the assumption that if no period of limitation is provided in the schedule to the Limitation Act for a situation for which an application which is contemplated by