The public purpose of planned development of Delhi was sufficiently specified in the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the Society's layout plans were not sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi.

( 1 ) THIS is a letters patent appeal from the order of a learned single Judge dated Novem- ber 15, 1972. Friends Housing Society, re- spondent No. 1, is a partnership concern (Society ). They acquired certain lands in Delhi tor a housing colony. They pre- pared a layout plan for the purpose in contemplation.

( 2 ) ON July 19, 1956 the appellant, Union of India, issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (the Act) for acquisition of the lands of the Society. The Society filed objec- tions. After some correspondence the lands were denotified on December 19, 1957.

( 3 ) SO far ao good. A fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued in respect of a large area of land in Delhi including the land in dispute on Novem- ber 1 3, 1959. The Society filed objections against the said notification. On July 1, 1960, the Government issued a press note declaring its policy that all lands of which layout plans had been "fully sanctioned" by the appropriate authority before November 13, 1959 would not be acquired. In pursuance of this policy a Gazette notification was issued. This notification set out the names of such 16 colonies lands of which were excluded from notification, but the proposed colony of the Society was not denotified. Eventually on August 16. 1962. a declaration under Section 6 was issued in respect of the lands of the society. In December 1962 notice under Section 9 of the Act was made.

( 4 ) AGAINST these acquisition proceedings the Society brought a writ petition on April 23, 1963 for quashing the acquisition of their land. The learned Judge quashed the proceedings for acquisition of the land. He set aside the declaration under Section 6 of the Act and the proceedings subsequent thereto. From his decision the Union of India appeals to this court

( 5 ) TWO points were raised before the learned Judge. One was that the Society did not have any adequate opportunity to prefer meaningful objections against the acquisition of the land under Section 5-A of the Act. Section 5-A says that any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4 as being needed for a public purpose may within 30 days after the issue of the notification object to the acquisition of the land. The Collector shall then give him an opportunity of being heard. The public purpose mentioned in the preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Act dated November 13, 1959 was the "planned development of Delhi". Now with regard to the planned development of Delhi the Government prepared a draft master plan which was published on July 8, 1960 and thereafter a master plan was prepared which came into force on Sept. 1, 1962. It was said that without the master plan which provides for the planned development of Delhi the Society could not effectively object to the intended acquisition. Nor, it was said, could it avail of the opportunity of being heard which is given by the land acquisition Collector to the objector unless the master plan is in existence disclosing in detail the programme and policy of "planned development". The argument centres round the opportunity to object. It is said that the opportunity without the master plan was an empty formality.

( 6 ) THIS ground prevailed with the learned Judge. He applied the Supreme Court decision in Munshi Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1150. He held that in the present case on the date of the notification, that is, November 13, 1959, even the draft master plan had not been published and so the Society had no opportunity to file effective objections and, therefore, on this ground the acquisition proceedings were bad.

( 7 ) NOW this objection of the Society cannot succeed because the Supreme Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077 has upheld the validity of this very notification dated November 13, 1959 which is the subject of challenge by the Society in these proceedings. The Supreme Court has held that "in the case o