( 51 ) IT was next contended that even if the Rastogis had committed contempt, it was not of 'such a nature' as to warrant any punishment. The argument is based on Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act. That section says that :'notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence under this Act for a contempt of court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. 'mr. Tandon maintained that the failure of the Rastogis to deposit the takings with the Receiver did not 'substantially' interfere or tend to interfere 'with the due course of justice'. The reasons which he advanced were more or less the same as those for his submission that the disobedience of the Rastegis was not 'wilful'. He greatly emphasised the fact that no monetary loss had been caused to Vishwanath or anyone else. For, as was apparent from the accounts, the takings were not enough even to pay the Rastogis their weekly amount, and there was no possibility of any surplus. Indeed, he argued, the loss, if any, had been to themselves, because if they had paid over the takings to the Receiver, they would have received back more from him. Again, we were reminded, that the Rastogis had made no default till 5th October, 1977, and their conduct afterwards was entirely provoked by the attitude of the Receiver. And, that in the circumstances prevailing after 5th October, 1977, the Rastogis had little or no option but to disobey the orders of the court if the cinema was to be run. Having regard to all these aspects, we were urged, to treat the contempt as merely 'technical' and refrain from imposing a sentence.

( 52 ) APART from the probable fact that no monetary loss has resulted to Vishwanath or any other person from the contempt committed by the Rastogis, the rest of these points are not germane to the application of Section 13. Under that section the only question for consideration is, whether the contempt has interfered 'substantially' with the 'due course of justice' or 'tends' to do so. The reasons why the contempt was committed, and any mitigating factors, are all irrelevant.

( 53 ) THE key word in the section is 'substantially'; and, in deciding whether the interference 'with the due course of justice' is substantial or not, what one is required to look at is the 'nature' of the contempt. While weighing the pros and cons, it has further to be remembered that the interference need not be actual. A mere tendency in that direction is sufficient. However, this kind of surface analysis of the section does not take one very far. It only serves to fix the points of reference when dealing with a concrete case.

( 54 ) IT is obvious that the section is an application of the maxim 'de minimis non curat lex'. The doctrine that 'the law does not concern itself about trifles' has 'frequest practical applications' of which many examples are collected in Broom's Legal Maxims (10th ed.) at pages 88 90. A well-known statutory instance is section 95 of the Indian Penal Code. It excludes from the concept of an 'offence' anything which causes harm 'so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm'.

( 55 ) EVER since the law of contempt has existed, it has been an established rule that the courts will not punish for a contempt which is merely 'technical'. The word 'substantial' has also been used in similar contexts to convey the same idea. Thus, in Ananta Lal Singh and others v. Alfred Henry Watson and others, AIR 1931 Cal 257 (14), Rankin, C. J. ,said:. . . . . . . . . THE Court's jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice. 'i interject here to say, that this was probably the draftsman's inspiration for Section 13 as it seems to echo those words. The judgment conti

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