1953 Supreme(SC) 59

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
8th May 1953
M. PATANJALI SASTRI, CJI., B.K. MUKHERJEA, S.R. DAS, GULAM HASAN AND BHAGWATI, JJ.
Brahma Prakash Sharma and other, Appellants
Versus
The State of U.P.
Criminal Appeal No. 24 of 1951.
Advocates appeared
Shri M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General, for India, Shri K. S. Krishnaswamy Ayengar and Shri S. P. Sinha, Senior Advocates, (Shri V. N. Sethi, Shri K. B. Asthana, Shri N. C. Sen, Shri K. N. Agarwala, Shri Shankar Hussain, Shri K. P. Gupta, Shri M. D. Upadhyaya and Shri G. C. Mathur, Advocates with them), instructed by Shri S. C. Shukla, Agent, for Appellants; Shri Gopalji Mehrotra and Shri Jagdish Chandra, Advocates instructed Shri C. P. Lal, Agent, for the State.

Headnote:Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, S. 3-Reflection on conduct or character of Judicial Officers-When amounts to contempt of Court.-Matters to be considered-Jurisdiction to be sparingly exercised.

       

       The appellants were members of the Executive Committee of the District Bar Association at Muzafarnagar in D. P. The Committee passed resolutions stating that " it is now their considered opinion that the two officers are thoroughly incompetent in law, do not inspire confidence in their judicial work, are given to stating wrong facts when passing orders and are overbearing and discourteous to the litigant public and the lawyers alike, etc"., Copies of the resolutions were sent to the District Magistrate, Commissioner of the Division, the Chief Secretary and the Premier of D.P. with covering letters marked " confidential". Proceedings for contempt of courts were then started in Allahabad High Court. The six members of the Executive Committee at the relevant date were found guilty of contempt of court and though their unqualified apology was accepted, they were directed to pay Rs. 300/- as the costs of the Government Advocate. There was an appeal to. The Supreme Court from this order.

       Held: (1) It admits of no dispute that the summary jurisdiction excised by superior courts in punishing contempt of their authority exists for the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice and for maintaining the authority of law as is administered in the courts. It would be only repeating what has been said so often by various judges that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act of conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened.

       (2) Cases of contempt which consist of scandalising the court itself are fortunately rare and require to be treated with much discretion. Proceedings for this species of contempt should be used sparingly and always with reference to the administration of justice. If a Judge is defamed in such a way as not to affect the administration of justice, he has the ordinary remedies for defamation if he should feel impelled to use them. It seems, therefore, that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by "scandalising the court itself. In the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties, would not be contempt if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can be created.

       In the second place, when attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the Judge and what amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the Judge is concerned does not necessarily make cit a contempt. The distinction between a libel and a contempt was pointed out by a Committee of the Privy Council, to which a reference was made by the Secretary of State in 1892-1893 A.C. 138.

       (3) A defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libel so far as the Judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libeller in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due Course of justice or proper administration of law by such Court, it can be punished summarily as contempt One is a wrong done to the Judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regaling the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Courts administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well established that it is not necessary to prove affirmative, that the has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement, it is enough if it is likely or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law.

       (4) On fact, of the case, the only portion of the resolution to which

       prima facie objection can be token that which describes these officers thoroughly incompetent in law and whose judicial work does not inspire confidence. These remarks are certainly of a sweeping nature and can sear eely be justified. Assuming however, that this portion of the resolution defamatory, the question arises whether it can be held to amount to contempt of court. To answer this question, we have to see whether it is in any way calculated to interfere with the administration of justice in these courts or in other words whether such statement is likely to give me to an apprehension in the minds of litigants as to the two judicial officers to deal properly with cases coming before them even to embarrasses the office themselves in the discharge of their euties.

       We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that whether not the representation made by the appellants in the present case is calculated to produce these result is to be determined solely and .exclusively with reference to the language or contents of the resolutions themselves and that no other fact circumstantial can he looked into for this purpose except perhaps as matters which would aggravate or mitigate the offence of contempt, if such offence in found to have been committed. It may be that pleas of justification or privilege are not strictly speaking available to the defendant in contempt proceedings. The question of publication also in the technical sense in which it is relevant in a libel action may be inappropriate to the law of contempt.

       "But, leaving out cases of ex facie contempt, where the question arises as to whether a defamatory statements directed against a Judge calculated to undermine the confidence of the public in the capacity of the Judge, or is likely to deflect the court itself from a strict and unhesitant performance of its duties, all the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the statement we made and the degree of publicity that w" given to it would undoubtedly be relevant certain. It is true the learned counsel for the respondent suggests that the matter was discussed in the present case among the members of the Bar, and it might have been the subject matter of discussion amongst the officers also to whom copies of the resolution were sent. No doubt, there was publication", in required by the law of libel, but in contempt proceedings, that is not by any means conclusive. What is material is the nature and extent of the publication and whether or not it w" likely to have an injurious effect on the mind of the public of the judiciary itself and the by lead to inference with the administration of justice.

       "On the materials before us, it is difficult to say that the circumstances

       under which the representation was made by the appellants was calculated to have such effect. There might have been some remote possibility but that cannot be taken note of. We are clearly of the opinion that the contempt, if any, was only of a technical character, and that after the affidavits were filed on behalf of the appellants before the High Court, the proceedings against them should have been dropped. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside." (Per Mukherjea J.).