1977 Supreme(Del) 51
High Court Of Delhi
RAM NARAIN KHANNA - Appellant
Versus
S.ISHAR SINGH - Respondent
SECOND APPEAL 95 of 1971
Decided On : 04/20/1977
Advocates Appeared:
C.S.DUGGAL, G.S.Vohra, K.L.VOHRA
( 51 ) IT appears to us that this expression "prima facie" is coined by the courts to distinguish a finding on a question at the interlocutory stage as opposed to a finding given at the final stage of the trial. At the same time, for purposes of section 15 (1), the determination of relationship and/or arrears of rent have to be final only for the limited purpose of section 15 (1), and in that sense the finding is prima facie as opposed to the determination of the question at the end of the trial. Deshpande, J. further wen,t on to observe :"the Controller has no jurisdiction to pass the order unless he first definitively finds that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties. The consequences of the wrong practice followed by the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal, as in the present case, are serious. A non-compliance with the order under section 15 (1) by the tenant would be visited with the penalty of striking off the defence under section 15 (7) which would result in the Controller passing an order for eviction against the tenant. If the Controller, therefore, passes an order under section 15 (1) without deciding the relationship between the parties and the non-compliance of this order results in the eviction of the tenant and if ultimately the Controller finds that the relationship did not exist between the parties, irrepairable damage would have been caused to the tenant by being evicted from the premises by the Controller who did not have jurisdiction to pass the order under section 15 (1 ). Further, an order passed by the Controller under section 15 (1) without first determining whether the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties would be in contravention of the fundamental provisions of section 15 (1) itself which requires the existence of the rclationship as a jurisdictional condition precedent to the exercise of the power by the Controller under section 15 (1 ). Such an order would, therefore, be without jurisdiction according to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(1968) 3 SCR 662 (6 ). It is not possible, therefore, to countenance the present practice followed by the Controllers and the Rent Control Tribunal that the order under section 15 (1) can be passed without first determining the jurisdictional condition about the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It is to be noted that the Controller has only to determine such a jurisdictional condition before passing order under section 15 (1 ). "
( 52 ) JT is also true that the Controller has no jurisdiction to pass the order unless he definitely finds that the alleged tenant is a tenant in the premises but it goes without saying that this finding again has to be given only for purposes of section 15 (1) and the alleged tenant would still be entitled to plead on merits during trial that he is not the tenant of the person who claims to be landlord. It is, however, clarified that we do not understand the aforesaid observations of Deshpande, J. to mean that the definitive finding of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is final for the trial. The finding of relationship of landlord and tenant has again got to be prima facie as opposed to the ultimate finding given at the end of the trial.
( 53 ) IN view of the above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
YOGESHWAR DAYAL
( 1 ) THIS appeal has been placed before the Division Bench in view of order of reference to a larger bench dated 6th October, 1972, passed by T. P. S. Chawla, J. , and raises a question as to the procedure the Controller ought to follow before passing order under section 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ).
( 2 ) THE respondent-landlord instituted proceedings for eviction under the Act against the appellant, the tenant. One of the grounds on which eviction was sought was that th
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