The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by other provisions of the CrPC, and an accused person who fails to avail of the right to appeal or revision cannot seek relief under Section 482 of the CrPC to have subsequent sentences made concurrent with previous sentences.

( 1 ) THESE six petitions. Cr. Misc. (Main) Nos. 122 of 1977, 69 of 1977, 169 of 1977, 145 of 1977, 136 of 1977 and 174 of 1977, have been REFERRED TO by a learned Single Judge for determination of the question whether the High Court in the exericse of ifs inherent powers at the instance of a party who has a right of appeal or revision but has not availed himself of that right, can pass an order directing that a sentence of imprisonment awarded to such a person on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment when he is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment on an earlier conviction shall run concurrently with such previous sentence. Since the common question of law stated above arises in these petitions, it would be appropriate to dispose them of by a single judgment.

( 2 ) ALL the petitioners had been convicted separately in different cases and sentenced to various terms by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi. For the purposes of this order the facts of the various cases in which the petitioners were convicted and sentenced need not be racapittflated. In fact, the petitioners themselves have avoided staling the facts in detail.

( 3 ) SUB-SECTION (1) of section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (herein called the Code ) envisages that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.

( 4 ) PROVIDED that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under section 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately.

( 5 ) SUBSECTION (2) provides that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term of imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.

( 6 ) IT is evident from a perusal of the above section that the requirement of the law is that a person who is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment on being sentenced to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, on a subsequent conviction unless the Court recording the subsequent conviction directs that the subsequent sentence awarded shall run concurrently with the previous sentence, shall undergo the imprisonment or imprisonment for life awarded on subsequent conviction at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he had been previously sentenced. The stage for exercising this discretion is at the time Court records a subsequent conviction and inflicts punishment on the accused. The exercise of this power is confined to the realm of giving a direction in what manner the subsequent sentence, when an accused is already undergoing a sentence in a previous conviction, is to be executed. No duty, however, is cast on the Court, in terms of this section, to consider the question of the subsequent sentence being made concurrent with the sentence the accused was undergoing in a previous conviction. The language of the section invests the Court with a discretion albeit a judicial discretion in suitable cases on a subsequent conviction, to direct that the sentence of imprisonment awarded on the subsequent conviction shall run concurrent with the sentence the accused was already undergoing. However, in cases where the offences committed by an accused person, giving rise to separate trials resulting in convictions are distinct and are not intimately connected being of different genesis the Court may consider it more appropriate that the sentence awarded on subsequent conviction be allowed to take its normal course. The disc