1976 Supreme(Del) 142

High Court Of Delhi
V.L.KASHYAP - Appellant
Versus
R.P.PURI - Respondent
Civil 369 of 1976
Decided On : 09/22/1976

The defences available to a petition for eviction filed on the ground mentioned in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act are the same as available under the Act prior to its amendment. Such defences are not available against the merits of the petition filed under s. 14 of the Act which has created a new cause of action and conferred a new statutory right on the landlord to obtain eviction.

Headnote:

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 14a - Eviction of tenant - Bona fide personal necessity of landlord - Procedure - Leave to contest petition - Grounds - Scope of revision under sub-section (8) of section 25b.

Fact of the Case:

The instant case involves a bunch of revisions filed under sub-section (8) of section 25b of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 18 of 1976, which came into force on 1/12/1975. The amendments have been made in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 59 of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). These revisions raise common questions of law of general importance and are, therefore, taken up for decision together.

Finding of the Court:

1. The object of section 14a is to enable allottees of Government accommodation, who in their name or in the name of their wife or dependent child owned residential accommodation in Delhi must vacate the public premises so that they can be allotted to more deserving cases and in default allottees must incur certain obligations. Such landlord-owners, whose allotment of public premises has been cancelled, have been made entitled to recover possession of the residential accommodation owned by them immediately untrammelled by any conditions or restrictions imposed by any law or any term of the contract of tenancy. Such landlords could obtain this relief expeditiously and a special procedure has been prescribed by Chapter IIIA, which has also been made applicable to other landlords seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide personal necessity under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14. 2. The procedure prescribed by section 25b of the amended act governs new petitions for eviction and does not apply to the petitions already pending. 3. The leave to contest the petition will be granted if the defence taken is clear, specific and positive and is raised bona fide not intended merely to gain time and the affidavits and documents accompanying the same disclose facts which if true, disentitle the landlord to obtain an order for recovery of possession. After leave has been granted, the petition would be tried on merits according to law. 4. The defences open to a petition for eviction filed on the ground mentioned in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 14 of the Act are the same as available under the Act prior to its amendment. 5. Such defences are not available against the merits of the petition filed under s. 14 of the Act which has created a new cause of action and conferred a new statutory right on the landlord to obtain eviction. The defences on merits in such cases must be confined only to fulfilment or otherwise of the conditions and restrictions mentioned in s. 14a alone, apart from any defence of a procedural nature, which be available according to law. 6. In section 14a the last expression in the purview possession of any premises let out by him includes the landlord filing the petition who has succeeded the landlord who initially let out the premises. 7. The londlord owning two or more dwelling-houses and seeking recovery of possession of one of them must specify all the houses owned by him or his wife or dependent child and indicate the one of which he seeks recovery of possession. 8. The meaning of dwelling-house is not confined to a part of the building containing a premises, but it means the whole building consisting, if necessary, of one or more premises, as defined by the Act, but the whole building must be. such as is reasonably intended to be used separately as one residential house. 9. The scope of revision under sub-section (8) of section 25b of the Act is as laid down by the Supreme Court in Harishankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal, AIR 1963 SC 698 (25).

Issues: 1. Whether the leave to contest the petition for eviction should be granted? 2. What are the defences available to a petition for eviction filed on the ground mentioned in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act? 3. Whether such defences are available against the merits of the petition filed under s. 14 of the Act? 4. Whether the landlord owning two or more dwelling-houses and seeking recovery of possession of one of them must specify all the houses owned by him or his wife or dependent child and indicate the one of which he seeks recovery of possession? 5. What is the meaning of dwelling-house? 6. What is the scope of revision under sub-section (8) of section 25b of the Act?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The leave to contest the petition will be granted if the defence taken is clear, specific and positive and is raised bona fide not intended merely to gain time and the affidavits and documents accompanying the same disclose facts which if true, disentitle the landlord to obtain an order for recovery of possession. 2. The defences open to a petition for eviction filed on the ground mentioned in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 14 of the Act are the same as available under the Act prior to its amendment. 3. Such defences are not available against the merits of the petition filed under s. 14 of the Act which has created a new cause of action and conferred a new statutory right on the landlord to obtain eviction. The defences on merits in such cases must be confined only to fulfilment or otherwise of the conditions and restrictions mentioned in s. 14a alone, apart from any defence of a procedural nature, which be available according to law. 4. The londlord owning two or more dwelling-houses and seeking recovery of possession of one of them must specify all the houses owned by him or his wife or dependent child and indicate the one of which he seeks recovery of possession. 5. The meaning of dwelling-house is not confined to a part of the building containing a premises, but it means the whole building consisting, if necessary, of one or more premises, as defined by the Act, but the whole building must be. such as is reasonably intended to be used separately as one residential house. 6. The scope of revision under sub-section (8) of section 25b of the Act is as laid down by the Supreme Court in Harishankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal, AIR 1963 SC 698 (25).

Final Decision: The revisions are disposed of as follows: C. R. 369 of 1976: Allowed. The order of the Controller is set aside to the extent it affects the rights of the petitioner before the court. The Controller will now grant leave to the petitioner to contest the petition and proceed according to law. C. R. 474 of 1976: Allowed. The order of the Additional Controller is set aside. The Additional Controller is directed to consider the matter afresh and if he finds that the defence raised by the petitioner is clear, specific and positive, and bona fide, then he will grant leave to the petitioner to contest the petition. C. R. 322 of 1976: Dismissed. The order of the Controller is affirmed. C. R. 326 of 1976: Dismissed. The order of the Controller is affirmed. C. R. 349 of 1976: Dismissed. The order of the Controller is affirmed.