( 51 ) ANOTHER reason for not making any reduction is that the claimants have been deprived of the enhanced compensation now for nearly ten years. No interest for this period has been allowed.

( 52 ) THE needs of the son will also increase as he enters the portals of life. Provision for his marriage, training for business etc. , will also have to be made. No special allowance has been made on this account in the award. It will be unfair to limit the award to 18 years on the ground that the liability ceases on child becoming sui juris. "the right consideration ought to be-what is the financial benefit of which the family can be reasonably said to have been deprived by the span of life of the deceased having been cut short on account of the fatal accident" (See Kuldip Lal Bhandari v. Urned Singh, 1966 A. C. J. 110 (6) and Sood and Company v. Surjit Kain, 1973 A. C. J. 414 (7 ). The deceased was the hub around which the whole family revolved. He was their mainstay.

( 53 ) ON similar considerations judges in case after case have refused to reduce the amount. (See Damyanti Devi v. Sita Devi, 1972 A. C. J. 334 (8) Sood and Company v. Surjit Kaur 1973 A. C. J. 414; Jaswant Kaur v. Ratti Ram 1971 A. C. J. 31 (9) and Kailashwati v. Haryana State, 1974 A. C. J. 514 (10 ).

( 54 ) IT was argued that the award of Rs. 24,100 will be too high. Reliance was placed on Sharda Devi v. Mahalaxmi Stone Mills, 1973 A. C. J. 371 (11) and Harathi Adirajaiah v. Savandamma, 1973 A. C. J. 203 (12 ). I should perhaps say this. Tn each case the per computation is a question of fact. "no one knows what is the right sum of damage in any particular case. and no two cases are alike" (Waldon v. War Office 1956 (1) W. L. R. 51 (13) per Singleton L. J.) There is no omnipotent criterion, capable of solving all problems arising in the law of damages. I would hesitate to particularize the rules governing quantification. As recently as 1963 Upjohn L. J. was moved to remark that "the assessment of damages has never been an exact science; it is essentially practical". (Charter House Credit v. Tolly (1963) 2 Q. B. 683 (711) (14 ). The right figure to be awarded has to be found empirically. One's practical judgment, robust common sense and instinct enable one to reach a sound conclusion. "at the end of the day arithmatic may have to be mitigated bycommonsense. " (Danielv. Jones, (1961) I W. L. R. 1103) (15 ).

( 55 ) THE distinguishing features of the present case are that the widow has not remarried. The aged mother has survived beyond the expectation of the tribunal and continues to live in the twilight of her existence. After the judgment in this case in 1967 prices have risen to such an extent that I cannot blame the tribunal for not taking them into account. The tribunal could not have gazed into the future and predict that some date the value of the rupee will go down to 37 paise as is shown in the official index. In making the assessment this court can look at events since the accident to see whether contingencies have become certainties.

( 56 ) IN Philips v. Ward (1956) I W. L. R. 471 (474) (16) Denning LJ said:"the general principle of English law is that damages must be assessed as at the date when the damage occurs. "

( 57 ) THIS is, with respect, misleading. The true principle is that damages are assessed on the basis of the plaintiff's loss at the date of judgment-trial as well as appellate (See Bwllfa and Merthyr Dare Steam Collieries Ltd. v. Pontypridd Waterworks Co. (1903) A. C. 426 (431) (17) per Lord Macnaghten ). In this case the tribunal thought the widow will remary. She has not. The tribunal thought that the aged mother will not live long. But here age is yet living to greater age. I cannot disregard these vital facts.

( 58 ) FOR these reasons I would allow F. A. 0. 171 of 1967 with costs by substituting for the tribunal's figure of Rs. 12,952 the sum of Rs. 24,100. The appellants in this appeal have already been paid Rs. 12,952. Now they will be ent

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