000 1,38,000 B. 1. 00,000 1,80. 000 2,00,000 1,50,000 1,72,500 C. 1,00,000 2,00,000 2,40,0001,70,000 1,95,500 ____________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________________________________ Compensation Actual Black deemed penalty Actual loss actual gain to under Land money passing under impugned to buyer seller Acq. Act provisions ____________________________________________________________________________ 6 7 8 9 10 ____________________________________________________________________________ Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. 2,01,250 2,30,000 30,000 30,000 63,250 57,500 12,000 7,500 50,000 80,000 2,76,000 30,000 80,500 4,500 1,00,000 ____________________________________________________________________________ But the extent of penalties imposed on them differ widely. Similarly, the actual loss suffered by the buyer and the actual gain made by the seller also differ widely. Again it was said that the Act treated equals as unequals and was, therefore, discriminatory. This chart, in our view, is unrealistic. It would be against human nature and common sense that for three properties of which the fair market value was different from each other, the amount of black money consideration paid by the buyer would be the same particularly when even the actual consideration paid by the buyer for the three properties was different. Ordinarily, the amount of the hidden black money consideration would proportionately rise with the magnitude of the transaction. For instance, in a transaction of immovable property with a fair market value of Rs. 2,40,000. 00 the black money part of the concealed consideration would be much more than Rs. 30,000. 00 if in a transaction of an immoveable property of which the fair market value is Rs. l,75,000. 00 the black money consideration is Rs. 30,000. 00 only. Vice versa, if the black money consideration in a transfer of immoveable property of the fair market value of Rs. 2,40,000. 00 is only Rs. 30,000. 00 then in a transfer of immoveable property of a market value of Rs. l,75,000. 00 the black money consideration would be less than Rs. 30,000. 00. In actual practice, therefore, it would be found that the larger the proportion of black money consideration in a transaction the greater would be the deemed penalty proportionately and similarly the compensation paid on the stated consideration would bear a similar proportion to the actual sale price. This is how it should be. The larger the proportion of the disclosed consideration in an instrument of transfer the lesser would be the proportion of the penalty and larger would be the. proportion of compensation which the purchaser would get. The chart submitted by the petitioner is thus vitiated by an unreal and purely theoritical assumption that the amount of black money consideration could be the same even though the disclosed consideration and the fair market values of the properties were widely different.

( 27 ) RELIANCE was then placed on Kunnathat Thathunni Moppil Nair v. State of Kerala, (1961) 3 S. C. R. 77, (14), for the proposition that lack of classification among transactions in which the amount of black money involved was the same created inequality of treatment among the purchasers. The said decision has no application to the present case. It rested on the reason that the difference in quality and productive capacity of the land which could be known were not taken into account in imposing a uniform rate of basic tax on such widely different pieces of land. The decision was distinguished later by the majority of the Supreme Court in Twyford Tea Company Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1970) 3 S. C. R. 383 (15 ). Hidayatullah, C. J. , speaking for the majority observed at pages 389-90 as follows:-

"it may also be conceded that the uniform tax falls more heavily on some plantations than on others because the profits are widely discrepant. But does that involve a discrimination? If the answer be in

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