The main legal point established in the judgment is the strict compliance with the statutory provisions for the delivery of the arbitral award and the lack of power to condone delay beyond the specified period, as stipulated in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

( 1 ) THIS Appeal assails the Order of the learned Single Judge passed on 9. 12. 2004 dismissing the Appellant's Objections under Section 34 of the arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 'a and C Act') on the grounds that they had been filed beyond the period stipulated by the statute. The application for condoning the delay in filing these Objections has been dismissed holding that the Court did not possess any power to condone the delay. The learned Single Judge has applied the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India -vs- Popular Construction Co. , (2001) 8 SCC 470 = 2001 (6) Scale 657, and in particular paragraph 12 thereof. Having dismissed the Objections the learned Single Judge had also directed that the Bank Guarantees retained by the respondent/judgment Debtor should also be returned on or before 15. 1. 2005.

( 2 ) THE assailed Award purports to have been signed on 20. 1. 1997. Execution proceedings have inexplicably been initiated by the Respondent after the passage of seven years thereafter. The Appellant/objector categorically contends that a copy of the Award was not delivered to it at any time, even though this was statutorily required to be done. Section 31 (5) of the A and C Act states that " "after the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party". The further argument on behalf of the Appellant is that it learnt of the passing of this Award only on 23. 3. 2004 when it received notice in the execution Proceedings (Ex. P. 4/2004 ). The Appellant thereafter states that "files of the Execution Case were subsequently inspected, a copy of the award obtained from the Respondent/claimant and now the objections under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are being filed". The Objections under Section 34 of the A and C Act challenging the Award are dated 31. 7. 2004 of which the supporting Affidavit is dated 30. 7. 2004 They came to be eventually filed in the Registry of this Court on 7. 8. 2004 An application under Section 34 of the A and C Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, which ought to have accompanied the Objections, appears to have been filed on 4. 10. 2004 It is obvious, therefore, that even though the Award visited the Appellant with a liability running into several lacs of rupees which after interest would run into crores of rupees, the conduct of the Appellant manifests repeated and reckless carelessness. Even in such cases the request that is repeatedly made to the Court is that the delay and inept handling by Government organisations should at the most be looked upon askance, and the Court should bail out and rescue a slothful party from the legal grave that it has dug for itself. We should not overlook the fact that Parliament has made no distinction between Government and private persons so far as the law of limitation is concerned. Experience has shown that latitude given by the Courts has only come to be misused; delay of some days of yore, has been replaced by delay of months and years.

( 3 ) IT is in these circumstances that we have to decide whether the application seeking condonation of delay in filing Objections to an Award is maintainable and could be granted by the Court. The learned Single Judge has applied paragraph 12 of Popular Construction, which reads as follows: 12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to sub-section (3 ). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso,would render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a