IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
HONBLE DR. JUSTICE MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, CHIEF JUSTICE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.
MR. RAVI KR. MATHUR .... Appellant
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA and ANR. .... Respondents.
LPA NOS. 1897 AND 1835 OF 2006
Decided on : 4th March, 2008.
Constitution of India, 1950
Article 16 - Deputationist can always be repatriated to his parent service - Even when tenure of deputation is specified, a deputatonist does not have and indefeasible right to hold the post - Ordinarily, term of deputation should not be curtailed but when exceptional circumstances exist specified tenure can also be curtailed - Chief Justice of Rajashtan High Court curtailed tenure in view of exceptional circumstances and in public interest - Held that writ petition rightly rejected - Appeal dismissed.
SANJIV KHANNA, J:
1. Mr. R K Mathur and Mr. K L Sharma are members of Rajasthan Higher Judicial Services (hereinafter referred to as RHJS, for short). Both of them were appointed as Presiding Officers of Debt Recovery Tribunal at Delhi. Notifications appointing them as Presiding Officers stipulated that they were appointed for a period of 5 years from the specified dates or till they attained age of 62 years, whichever was earlier.
2. By two separate letters dated 6th July, 2006 and 21st July, 2006, High Court of Rajasthan sought repatriation of Mr. R K Mathur and Mr. K L Sharma, respectively from their posting as Presiding Officers to RHJS. Pursuant to these letters, the Central Government informed the appellants that their posting as Presiding Officers was terminated and they stand repatriated.
3. The appellants challenged their repatriation to RHJS by filing writ petitions. By the impugned judgment dated 7th September, 2006, the writ petitions have been dismissed. Learned Single Judge has held that the appellants had continued to retain their position as Judicial Officers of RHJS and being on deputation, the Rajasthan High Court could have recalled them at any time. It has also been held that Section 15 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Bank and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, (hereinafter referred to as “Act”, for short) relating to resignation and removal of Presiding Officer is not applicable as the tenure appointment of the appellants was subservient to the original appointment in RHJS. Reference was made to the concept of deputation “as expounded in the case of State of Punjab and Others versus Indersingh and others reported in (1997) 8 SCC 372.
4. Notifications issued for appointment of the appellants are identically worded. The appellants were appointed as Presiding Officers for a period of 5 years from the date mentioned in the notifications or till they attain the age of 62 years, whichever was earlier. A tenure appointment is “an appointment to a permanent post which an employee may or may not hold for more than a limited period”. Tenure means “the term during which the office is held”. Once a person is appointed to a tenure post his appointment begins when he joins and it comes to an end on the completion of the tenure (See, L.P.Agarwal Versus Union of India, reported in (1992) 3 SCC 526 and S. K. Kacker (Dr.) Versus All India Institute of Medical Sciences, reported in (1996) 10 SCC 734). In S. K. Kacker (Dr.) case (Supra), the Supreme Court also examined concept of lien of a Government servant on appointment to a tenure post. It was observed that when a Government servant is appointed substantively to a permanent post or a tenure post, he becomes a Government servant for the purpose and for the period of tenure and is entitled to retain his lien unless the same is curtailed or shortened in accordance with law.
5. Our attention was also drawn to Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Higher Judicial Services Rules, which provides that on appointment to a tenure post, the lien of the judicial officer on the permanent post which he was holding shall stand suspended. The lien of the appellants as Officers in RHJS, therefore, does not get terminated. On appointment as Presiding Officers (DRT) the appellants did not cease to be members of RHJS and their lien continued, though it remained under suspension. Meaning of the term “lien” has been explained by the Supreme Court in Triveni Shankar Saxena Versus State of UP and Others reported in (1992) Suppli 1 SCC 524. In different contexts the word “lien” can refer to contractual lien, equitable lien, specific lien, general lien etc.. In legal sense lien means “right of a man to retain it rightfully and continuously in his possession belonging to another until the present and accrued claims are satisfied. (Refer, Halsburys Law as quoted in the said judgment). Lien implies that there is something in existence to which it attaches. It includes right of retention. Lien was defined i
Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia (2004) 2 SCC 65
Guwahati High Court v. Kuladhar Phukan (2002) 4 SCC 524
L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India (1992) 3 SCC 526
Paresh Chandra Nandi v. Controller of Stores (1970) 3 SCC 870
S.K. Kacker (Dr.) v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences (1996) 10 SCC 734
State of Punjab and Others v. Indersingh and others (1997) 8 SCC 372
Union of India v. Shardindu (2007) 6 SCC 276
Union of India v. V.E. Ramakrishnan (2005) 8 SCC 394
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