Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.

1. Temperance is the hallmark of judicial authority. The exercise of judicial authority is not show of strength but a duty to be performed with humility and yet firmness. This cardinal principle seems to have been lost while passing orders in the present case.

2. The petitioners, both ladies, have been charged under Sections 347/461 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) by the MCD on the allegation of misuse of property consisting ground floor of property bearing No. B-23, Greater Kailash, Part-I, New Delhi in the capacity of the owner/occupier. The criminal complaint No. 1291/2001 is filed by the MCD, which was pending in the Court of the learned MM. The offence is a bailable offence punishable with simple imprisonment, which may extend to six months or fine which may extend to Rs. 5,000.00 or with both. It is the case of the petitioners that they were only employees working in the said premises at the relevant time and had been falsely implicated on the inspection carried out since the owner/accused No. 1 was not present in the premises. The complaint was filed in the year 2001 and the misuse is stated to have been stopped by the owner and the premises are even stated to have been transferred on a subsequent date.

3. The petitioners state that they have been appearing in the complaint case commencing from their first appearance on 17.9.2002 without any default. On 30.10.2006 notice was framed under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C. against the petitioners and the matter was adjourned to 24.3.2008 for evidence. The petitioners alleged that they had wrongly noted the date as 25.3.2008 and thus failed to appear on 24.3.2008. An application for exemption on behalf of the first accused was moved which was allowed on 24.3.2008 but since neither the counsel nor the petitioners as accused Nos. 2 & 3 were present, the personal bonds and surety bonds were forfeited and NBWs were issued against the petitioners. Simultaneously notices under Section 446 of the Cr.P.C. were issued against the accused persons as well as the sureties returnable on 28.7.2008.

.4. The petitioners claimed that when they went to appear before the trial court on 25.3.2008 without their counsel (who was alleged to be out-of-station since 18.3.2008) they did not find the matter in the cause list. On contacting the counsel on 27.3.2008 they came to know what had transpired on 24.3.2008. The petitioners, thus, immediately filed application for cancellation of NBWs and for restoration of the personal bonds and surety bonds with an undertaking to appear before the trial court on the next date of hearing. However, the said application was dismissed by the impugned order dated 3.4.2008. The rationale for the impugned order is that for decision of the application it was necessary to decide whether the non-appearance of the petitioners was deliberate or due to a bonafide mistake. The trial court has noted that since the accused had come to court knowing that their counsel was out-of-station, the counsel must have informed the

.petitioners of the date of 24.3.2008 and his non-availability and thus it must be implied that they were aware of the next date of hearing. It has also been noticed that the counsel for the petitioners had been appearing for all the accused persons including accused No. 1 although there is no vakalatnama on record. On 24.3.2008 another counsel Shri Pradeep Jaiswal appeared for accused No. 1 and filed his vakalatnama along with exemption application and the counsel who filed the exemption application had the same address as of Shri B.K. Singh, who had appeared for the petitioners though without a vakalatnama. These counsels were, once again, present at the time of hearing of the application and thus it is assumed that Shri B.K. Singh, Advocate had knowledge of the hearing but instructed Shri Pradeep Jaiswal, Advocate to only appear for accused No. 1 and not for the petitioners herein