The main legal principle established is that at the stage of granting leave to defend, the court should consider whether the facts disclosed prima facie disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order, and that leave to defend must be granted when substantial triable issues are raised.

M.L. MEHTA, J.

1. Order impugned before this Court is the judgment of Additional Rent Controller (ARC) dated 11.01.2012 whereby the application for leave to defend to contest the eviction petition moved by the respondent was dismissed and an order of eviction was passed against the petitioner.

2. In the eviction petition filed by the respondent against the petitioner under Section 14(1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (herein after referred to as ‘DRCA’), it was submitted that the respondent owns property no. 43(suit property), Bhalla Building, G.B. Road, Delhi. Admittedly, the basement of the said property is under the tenancy of the petitioner at a monthly rent of Rs. 1163.33. It was further submitted that the respondent carries on the business of generators from a different premises bearing no. 47 G.B. Road, Delhi , taken on a monthly rent of Rs. 18,000/-. It was averred that the respondent has two sons carrying on the business of generators and cutting tools in the above mentioned rented premises and it was becoming increasingly difficult for the respondent and his sons to accommodate their ever growing customers in the tenanted shop. Hence, pleading bonafide requirement, the eviction petition was filed by the respondent.

3. The petitioner-tenant sought leave to contest the eviction petition by filing the application under Section 25-B (4 & 5) of DRCA contesting the claim of bonafide requirement made by the respondent. It was averred by the petitioner that the eviction petition cannot be tried by summary procedure as it was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-B because site plan of the suit premises was not filed by the respondent. It was further submitted that the lease deed of the tenanted shop in possession of the respondent was also not placed on record and no details were furnished by the respondent regarding the business carried on by the respondent and his sons and hence the requirement of the suit premises by the respondent was not established. It was further argued that the respondent did not mention in the eviction petition that his sons are in any way dependent on him for accommodation and, hence the petition lacked the necessary ingredients of Section 14 (1) (e) of DRCA. It was further averred by the petitioner that in the year 2002, the respondent sold one of his shopS on the ground floor of the building owned by him to M/s. Sardar Mill Store and in the year 2007, he sold the portion of first floor of the building to Ashoka Bearing Enterprises, which shows that there was no bonafide requirement of the respondent and the eviction petition was filed with the ulterior intent of selling the property at high prices. It was further contented that the respondent has concealed the fact that he filed an eviction petition against Sh. Nirmal Singh and Taranpreet Singh in respect of shop situated on the ground floor of the suit premises, wherein eviction order was passed on 12.07.2011 and hence the requirement of the respondent now stands fulfilled.

4. The averments made by the petitioner were refuted by the respondent in the reply to the application for leave to defend filed by him. The site plan of the suit premises and lease deed of the shop in possession of the landlord was placed before the Court. After consideration of the material on record, the ARC passed the impugned order, observing that no triable issue was made out by the petitioner and the respondent was able to establish the fact of bonafide requirement of the suit property for expanding the business with his sons and accordingly decreed the eviction order. The petitioner filed application for review of the order dated 11.01.2012 which ended with the same results.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before this Court that the petitioner had raised several triable issues in their leave to defend application but the ARC had exceeded his limited jurisdiction vested in him under Section 25-B of the DRCA by dismissing