2012 Supreme(Del) 2013
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
M.L. MEHTA, J.
AGGARWAL PAPERS : Petitioner
Versus
MUKESH KUMAR DECD THR LRS : Respondent
C.M. (M) 1080/2012
Decided On : 17.10.2012
Mr. Vikas Goyal & Mr. Kumar Mukesh, Advs.
Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Adv.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the obligation of the court to independently examine the landlord's alleged requirement for eviction, the consideration of subsequent events in evaluating the bonafide requirement, and the need for a cautious and judicious approach in granting or refusing leave to defend to a tenant.
Headnote:
Delhi Rent Control Act - Eviction - Section 14(1)(e), Section 25B(9) - The court discussed the legal provisions related to the grant of leave to defend application in the eviction petition, the consideration of subsequent events in evaluating the bonafide requirement of the landlord, and the burden of proof on the landlord to establish a bonafide requirement. The court emphasized the need for a cautious and judicious approach in granting or refusing leave to defend to a tenant and highlighted the obligation of the court to examine the landlord's alleged requirement independently.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, a tenant, challenged an eviction petition filed by the respondent/landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The petitioner's leave to defend application was dismissed, and an eviction order was passed. The petitioner filed a review application, which was also dismissed.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the petitioner had raised prima facie, triable issues that were overlooked by the lower court. It held that the impugned order suffered from infirmity, resulting in a miscarriage of justice to the petitioner, and granted leave to contest to the petitioner.
Issues: The main issues included the bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises by the landlord, the availability of alternative accommodation, and the qualification and intention of the landlord's daughter-in-law to practice as a lawyer from the tenanted premises.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the need for a cautious and judicious approach in granting or refusing leave to defend to a tenant, the consideration of subsequent events in evaluating the bonafide requirement of the landlord, and the obligation of the court to examine the landlord's alleged requirement independently.
Final Decision: The petition was allowed, and leave to contest was granted to the petitioner. The parties were advised to appear before the lower court on a specified date.
M.L. MEHTA, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 07.06.2012, passed by the CCJ-cum-ARC, Tis Hazari courts, Delhi, whereby the petition filed u/S 25 B (9) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short “the Act”), for review of the order dated 31.10.2011, was dismissed. The review was sought of the order dated 31.10.2011, whereby the petitioner’s leave to defend application was dismissed and consequent thereto, an eviction order was passed.
2. The petitioner is a tenant under the respondent in respect of a commercial premises situated on the 2nd floor of property bearing no.3649. Gali Rura Achar Wali, Chawri Bazar, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as “tenanted premises”). The respondent sought the eviction of the petitioner through a petition filed u/S 14 (1) (e) of the Act, on the submission that the tenanted premises was needed bonafide for the respondent/ landlord’s daughter-in-law, Smt. Rimpy Gupta, who has been enrolled as an advocate, and who intends to start her office as a lawyer along with her husband in the tenanted premises. The respondent alleges that he has no other suitable premises available with him. The respondent has stated in his eviction petition that he is carrying on business in hardware rubber and iron goods, aluminum, brass, door and window fittings, industrial and other trolley wheels, castor wheels, etc. Stock for the above said business is being stored in shops bearing No. 2 and No. 11 on the ground floor, entire first and third floors and a shed built up at the roof of the third floor of the suit premises.
3. The petitioner challenged the eviction petition on the following grounds. The main issue taken up by the petitioner was that the respondent was in possession of sufficient and alternative accommodation. In addition, the petitioner contended that the respondent’s son (husband of Smt. Rimpy Gupta), who was also practicing as an advocate, had an office in Sagar Apartment, Tilak Marg, New Delhi. During the pendency of the eviction petition before the Ld. ARC, the petitioner filed an application u/S 151 of the C.P.C. for bringing certain subsequent events on record. Vide the above application, it was averred that the respondent had obtained an eviction order against one Sh. Rishi Prakash, Advocate, with respect to another office premises, also situated on the second floor of the tenanted premises. The respondents have also obtained the possession of the same and since then have been keeping it under lock and key. The petitioner also contended that the respondents have other properties in Bawana Industrial area. The next ground taken up by the petitioner was that the respondents have not provided any document to substantiate that his daughter-in-law Rimpy Gupta is a practicing advocate, thus proving that his need was indeed bonafide. The learned ARC dismissed all these grounds vide order dated 31.10.2011. The petitioner subsequently filed a review application u/S 25 B (9) and the same was dismissed vide the impugned order dated 07.06.2012. Both these orders are under challenge in the present petition.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also the respondent and gone through the entire record.
5. The principles requiring considerations for grant of leave to defend application in the eviction petition have been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court way-back in the year 1982 in the case of Charan Dass Duggal Vs. Brahma Nand, 21 (1982) DLT 378 and which have been reiterated in various judicial pronouncements and can be noted thus:
“5. What should be the approach when leave to defend is sought for? There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave to defend is sought for, the tenant must make out such a prima facie case raising such pleas that a triabl