RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J

CM No.18690/2012 (for exemption)

Allowed, subject to just exceptions.

The application is disposed of.

WP(C) No.7248/2012

1. This writ petition impugns the order dated 06.11.2012 of the Central Information Commission (CIC) allowing the appeal preferred by the respondent No.4 Mr. Arun Kumar Agarwal and directing the Public Information Officer (PIO) of the respondent No.3 Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to provide the information sought, to the respondent No.4. Though as per the Roster of this Court, the writ petition challenging the order of the CIC is to be heard by a Single Judge of this Court but the same is listed before us because the petitioner has also sought a declaration of “Sections 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005 as ultra vires, unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India”. We have as such first heard the senior counsel for the petitioner on the vires of Sections 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act inasmuch as if we do not find any merit in the said challenge, the petition so far as challenging the order dated 06.11.2012 of the CIC, is to be considered by a Single Judge Bench of this Court.

2. Section 8 of the RTI Act details the information which is exempt from disclosure. Clauses (d) and (e) of Sub-section (1) thereof exempts from disclosure:

(i) Information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party; and,

(ii) Information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship. However both the aforesaid exemptions are subject to:

“unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information”.

3. Though the petitioner who is opposing the disclosure claiming exemption under Sections 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) supra, has sought declaration of the entire Sections 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) as ultra vires but the senior counsel for the petitioner has confined the challenge only to the “proviso” to the aforesaid exemptions. It is contended, that the “proviso” virtually takes away the exemption provided for in Sections 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e) and is too widely worded leaving unguided discretion in the Competent Authority to override the exemption by citing public interest, without defining “larger public interest” and is thus arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is alternatively contended that the said “proviso” may be required to be “read down”.

4. We are unable to find any merit in the challenge to the vires of the “proviso” aforesaid to Sections 8(1)(d) and 8(1)(e). “Public interest” is an expression which has found its way in several legislations and has been repeatedly and elaborately interpreted by the Courts and the ground of “public interest? being an amorphous, nebulous or vague and indefinite concept held to be not available for assailing the provision. It thus cannot be said that the use of the words “public interest” in the “proviso” vests unguided discretion in the Competent Authority.

5. The words “in the interest of the general public” were in Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597 held to have a clearly well defined meaning and not vague or undefined. Similarly in Premium Granites Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 2 SCC 691 as well as in Orissa Textile and Steel Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa (2002) 2 SCC 578, it was held that "public interest" was a definite concept and exercise of power "in public interest" though required to satisfy the test of reasonableness if challenged, cannot be said to be vesting unguided power. In between, in Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1980) 4 SCC 1, it was also held that the concept of public interest must, as far as possible, receive its orientation from the Directive Principles which embody par excellence the constitutional concept of public interest.

6. We