The main legal point established in the judgment is the scope of inquiry by the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act, 1947 and the circumstances under which the Tribunal can interfere with an order of dismissal.

Pradeep Nandrajog, J.

1. During the pendency of an industrial dispute between the management of the respondent and the workmen of Hotel Corporation of India, a charge sheet was issued against the appellant on January 13, 1986 alleging that a raid was conducted at counter No.4 on November 01, 1985 during which certain cuttings, over-writings and additions were noted on Ex.MW-1/5 maintained by the appellant and that there was an embezzlement in sum of Rs.116/-. The appellant denied the charge. An Inquiry Officer was appointed who submitted a report indicting the appellant resulting in the respondent passing an order dismissing appellant from service on September 25, 1991. Since an industrial dispute was pending when order of dismissal was passed, before given effect to it, the respondent filed an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the ID Act, 1947 seeking permission of the Industrial Tribunal to give effect to the penalty of dismissal.

2. The Industrial Tribunal framed an issue : Whether fair and just inquiry was held according to the principles of natural justice, and looked into the record of the inquiry conducted against the appellant.

3. Vide order dated December 20, 2003, the issue was decided against the respondent. Pithily stated, with reference to the record of the Inquiry Officer and the charge sheet issued to the appellant, the learned Industrial Tribunal noted that the documents which formed the basis of the charge sheet and which were relied upon by the Inquiry Officer were not supplied to the appellant nor was he given an inspection thereof. It was therefore held that the principle of natural justice were violated i.e. by not affording full opportunity to the appellant to defend himself. The learned Industrial Tribunal noted the proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Officer and brought out that on June 11, 1988 the appellant was asked to admit or deny the charges, which he denied, and thereafter the representative of the management filed and exhibited some documents and sought time to file more documents; the appellant requested the Inquiry Officer to direct the respondent to produce certain documents and file the same. The Inquiry Officer directed the respondents representative to submit a list of documents and on the next date the respondent sought time to do the needful. Two witnesses, Vijay Dhingra and Vikas Gambhir were proposed to be examined. On January 21, 1989 the respondent examined Sh.S.C.Bhalla as a witness who proved his report Ex.MW-2/1 which was based on the cuttings and over-writings on Ex.MW-1/5 and claimed that Vikas Gambhir and Vijay Dhingra had confirmed to him that the cuttings and over-writings existed when they seized the document from the appellant. The learned Industrial Tribunal noted that Vikas Gambhir and Vijay Dhingra had not been examined and opined that only those two have explained whether the cuttings preceded or succeeded the seizure of the document. The Industrial Tribunal noted that as per the workman, Ex.MW- 1/5 was a bogus certificate and no cuttings were made in his presence.

4. Holding the inquiry to be vitiated on aforesaid reasoning, the learned Industrial Tribunal noted that the respondent had not taken a plea in its pleadings that in case the inquiry is vitiated it should be given a chance to lead evidence on merit to prove the charge i.e. this was not pleaded either in the application seeking approval of the Industrial Tribunal to dismiss the appellant nor in the rejoinder filed to the reply filed by the appellant to the application filed by the respondent seeking permission of the Industrial Tribunal to give effect to its decision to dismiss the appellant from service. The Tribunal adjourned the matter to February 04, 2004 framing an issue : Whether the management is entitled to approval sought for or not?

5. An application was filed by the respondent seeking permission to lead evidence to prove the charge against the appellant on merits, which was dismissed vide or