IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J.
RAMA PANDEY - PETITIONER
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. - RESPONDENTS
WP(C) No. 844/2014
Decided On : 17.07.2015
MATERNITY LEAVE - SURROGACY - CENTRAL CIVIL SERVICES (LEAVE) RULES, 1972 - RULE 43 - INTERPRETATION - COMMISSIONING MOTHER - ENTITLEMENT TO MATERNITY LEAVE - HELD, COMMISSIONING MOTHER ENTITLED TO MATERNITY LEAVE UNDER RULE 43(1).
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, a female government servant, applied for maternity leave and child care leave after the birth of twins through surrogacy. The respondents rejected her application on the ground that there was no provision for grant of maternity leave in cases where the surrogacy route is adopted. The petitioner challenged the rejection of her application by way of a writ petition.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the petitioner was entitled to maternity leave under Rule 43(1) of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972. The court interpreted the term "maternity" in Rule 43(1) to include motherhood attained via surrogacy. The court held that the purpose of maternity leave is to protect the health and safety of pregnant women and to ensure the well-being of the child. The court found that the commissioning mother, who is the legal mother of the child, has a significant role to play in the care and upbringing of the child, both during and after pregnancy. The court also held that the competent authority should consider the circumstances of each case and grant maternity leave to the commissioning mother for a suitable period, taking into account the best interests of the child.
Issues: 1. Whether the petitioner was entitled to maternity leave under Rule 43(1) of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972, even though she had not conceived or carried the child herself.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the term "maternity" in Rule 43(1) of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 to include motherhood attained via surrogacy. The court held that the purpose of maternity leave is to protect the health and safety of pregnant women and to ensure the well-being of the child. The court found that the commissioning mother, who is the legal mother of the child, has a significant role to play in the care and upbringing of the child, both during and after pregnancy. The court also held that the competent authority should consider the circumstances of each case and grant maternity leave to the commissioning mother for a suitable period, taking into account the best interests of the child.
Final Decision: The court allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents to grant maternity leave to the petitioner for a suitable period, taking into account the best interests of the child.
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J.
FACTS
1 A synthesis of science and divinity (at least for those who believe in it), led to the culmination of the petitioner’s desire for a child. Married, on 18. 01. 1998, to one Sh. Atul Pandey, the petitioner’s, wish to have a child was fulfilled on 09. 02. 2013, albeit via the surrogacy route. Her bundle of joy comprised of twins, who were born on the aforementioned date, at a city hospital.
1. 1 To effectuate the aforesaid purpose, the petitioner had entered into an arrangement with, one, Ms Aarti, wife of Mr Surya Narayan (hereafter referred to as the surrogate mother). The arrangement required the surrogate mother to bear a child by employing the In-Vitro Fertilization (IVF) methodology. The methodology used and agreed upon required the genetic father to fertilize, In-Vitro, the ovum supplied by a designated donor. The resultant embryo was then required to be transferred and implanted in the surrogate mother. This arrangement, along with other terms and conditions, which included rights and obligations of the commissioning parents, as also those of the surrogate mother, were reduced to a written agreement dated 08. 08. 2012 (in short the surrogacy agreement).
2. The fact that the surrogacy agreement reached fruition, is exemplified by the birth of twins, as indicated above, on 09. 02. 2013. This far, the petitioner was happy; her unhappiness, however, commenced with rejection of her application dated 06. 06. 2013, for grant of maternity and Child Care Leave (CCL). By this application, the petitioner sought 180 days maternity leave and 3 months CCL. This application was addressed to respondent no. 3, with a copy to respondent no. 2.
2. 1 Respondent no. 3 vide a covering letter of even date, i. e. , 06. 06. 2013, forwarded the petitioner’s application to respondent no. 2, along with the requisite documents i. e. the surrogacy agreement and the birth certificate of the children. Respondent no. 3, sought clarification with regard to the request made by the petitioner for sanctioning the maternity leave. A perusal of the covering letter would show that the leave sought for the purposes of child care was not being objected to. A doubt, was raised only qua maternity leave.
2. 2 Evidently, vide communication dated 10. 10. 2013, petitioner’s request was rejected by respondent no. 3, based on, inputs received from respondent no. 2 vide two communications dated 04. 09. 2013 and 19. 09. 2013. The first communication appears to have been sent by Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS), [Headquarters], while the second was, evidently, sent by KVS (D. R. ). These communications, though, are not on record
2. 3 In sum, it was conveyed to the petitioner that there was no provision for grant of maternity leave in cases where the surrogacy route is adopted. The petitioner was, however, informed that the CCL could be sanctioned, in her favour, under Rule 43-A, which was applicable to “female government servants”. It now transpires that reference ought to have been made to Rule 43 and not Rule 43-A; a fact which was confirmed by the counsel for respondent no. 2 and 3.
2. 4 In the background of the aforesaid stand, the petitioner was requested to submit an application for CCL, in case she was desirous of availing leave on that account.
3. The petitioner being aggrieved, approached this court by way of the instant petition, filed, under Article 226 of the Constitution. Notice on this limited aspect was issued in the writ petition on 05. 02. 2014. Though counsels for parties were asked to file written submissions; except for respondent no. 2 none of the other parties filed written submissions in the matter. Counsels for respondents have not filed any counter affidavit in the matter. The reason for that, perhaps would be, that the facts in the matter are not in dispute. The issue raised in the writ petition is, a pure question of law.
4. I may only note that on 10. 02. 2015, respondents placed before this court an office m
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