The main legal point established is that the merger of companies under statutory provisions, resulting in the transfer of rights and liabilities, can be considered an involuntary act and may not amount to subletting under rent control laws.

Indermeet Kaur, J.

1. The impugned judgment is dated 21.05.2001. It had disposed of two appeals, one filed by the landlord i.e. British Motor Co. Ltd. and the other by the tenant i.e. Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. (HCB). The eviction petition filed by the landlord being EP No. 229/1988 had been dismissed by the Additional Rent Controller (ARC) vide judgment dated 03.11.1995. Appeal filed by the landlord was allowed; eviction petition stood decreed. This was on the ground of subletting as contained in Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA). Tenant is aggrieved by this finding.

2. Briefly stated the facts are that the landlord was aggrieved by an act of subletting of his tenant M/s HCB. Contention was that the tenant had sublet/assigned/parted with possession of the suit premises in favour of Punjab National Bank (PNB) without obtaining the written consent of the petitioner. It is not in dispute that M/s HCB had since been amalgamated with PNB by virtue of a Gazette Notification issued by the Ministry of Finance (Banking Division) Govt. of India; necessary effect was that M/s HCB became non-existent and its complete power and control vested with the transferee company i.e. PNB. Contention of the landlord was that this merger amounted to a subletting and the ground under Section 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA) became available to him. The ARC had dismissed his petition. The RCT had reversed this finding.

3. The only question which now has to be answered by this Court is whether the merger of M/s HCB with the PNB by virtue of a Gazette Notification dated 18.12.1986 issued by the Government of India under Section 45 (7) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation of the HCB (Kanpur) with the PNB amounted to a subletting under Section 14(1)(b) of the DRCA or whether being an involuntary act, it did not attract the provisions of Section 14(1)(b) of the said Act.

4. On behalf of the tenant, it has been contended that the impugned judgment suffers from an illegality as the view taken in the impugned judgment has now been set at rest by the judgment of this Court reported in Asha Rohtagi and Others v. Erstwhile New Bank of India through General Manager PNB 119 (2005) DLT 538 which was followed by a subsequent Division Bench judgment of this Court in Allahabad Bank v. M/s K. Kishore (HUF) in RFA No. 15/2006 dated 23.07.2007.

5. These arguments have been refuted. Contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the impugned judgment in no manner suffers from any infirmity; submission being that the ratio of Asha Rohtagi (Supra) and Allahabad Bank (Supra) would not be applicable to the factual scenario of the instant case. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that a clear distinction has to be drawn between the an administrative act and a legislative enactment; the notification issued under Section 45 (7) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and a notification under Section 9 of the Banking Acquisition Act are not paramateria one another; reliance has been placed upon AIR 1988 Supreme Court 686 K.I. Shephard and Others v. Union of India and others as also the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1996 Supreme Court 3208 New Bank of India Employees Union and another v. Union of India and others where the ratio of K.I. Shephard (Supra) had been quoted with approval; contention being that a legislative act is the creation and promulgation of a general rule of conduct without reference to a particular case; an administrative act is the making and issue of a specific direction or the application of a general rule to a particular case in accordance with the requirements of policy; contention being that the notification issued in the present case which was a notification under Section 45(7) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1945 was only an administrative process; such an administrative process is distinct from a legislative enactment; the presumption of involunt