The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the Limitation Act 1963 and the legal principles related to limitation in arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Valmiki J. Mehta, J. (Oral):--

1. This first appeal has been filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short ‘A&C Act’) against the judgment of the lower court dated 11.9.2009. Learned ADJ by the impugned judgment dismissed the objections filed by the appellant/Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) against the Award of the sole Arbitrator dated 19.9.2008. The Award of the Arbitrator is a common Award with respect to two claim petitions filed by the respondent/contractor with respect to two separate works. The parties were the same and therefore the Arbitrator delivered the common Award. One claim petition which was filed by the respondent was with respect to construction of pucca school building at M.C. Primary School at Sagarpur (old) West Zone, New Delhi. The second claim petition which was filed was with respect to construction work at Dabri. There were more or less similar heads of claims for both the works of the respondent-contractor and therefore the same were disposed of by the common Award dated 19.9.2008.

2. A reading of the impugned judgment shows that the court below has not at all discussed any of the claims, reasoning with respect to the same, or as to how awarding of the claims are legal or illegal or in accordance with the contract or not in accordance with the contract or perverse or if the Award is the view of a reasonable person. Except dealing with the findings of the Arbitrator with respect to the issue of limitation, the impugned judgment does not contain much. It is not expected of a court, much less the first court which hears objections under Section 34 of the A&C Act, to pass a cursory judgment without referring to the arguments qua each of the objections and as to how the said arguments are not acceptable under Section 34 of the A&C Act. Counsel for the appellant has therefore argued before me the various objections which have been raised against the Award as stated in the petition under Section 34 filed before the court below.

3. The first aspect which is argued on behalf of the appellant is that the claims filed by the respondent-contractor were barred by time. It is argued that the work in this case was completed, so far as the Sagarpur project is concerned, on 10.10.1996; and so far as Dabri project is concerned on 21.4.1994, and therefore the claim made for arbitration well after three years on 14.6.2000 would have the effect that the claim petitions would have been filed on 14.6.2000 and which claim petitions being beyond three years from the completion of works on 10.10.1996 (Sagarpur) and 21.4.1994 (Dabri) would be barred by limitation. Reliance in support of claims being time barred is placed upon a judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Satender Kumar v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr. 168 (2010) DLT 15. The judgment in the case of Satender Kumar (supra) has been followed in two other judgments by another learned Single Judge of this Court in the cases of Bindra Builders v. DDA & Anr. in CS(OS) 1001A/2001 decided on 30.7.2012 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s Harcharan Dass Gupta in OMP 249/2006 decided on 21.8.2012 and which are also relied upon by the appellant.

4. I may note that the counsel for both the parties conceded before me that the contractual clauses in the present case are completely identical with the contractual clauses in the reported judgment in the case of Satender Kumar (supra). Let us therefore refer to the relevant paragraphs of the judgment in the case of Satender Kumar (supra) and which read as under:-

“2. The two Articles of the Limitation Act 1963 which are relevant in this regard are Articles 18 and 137 and the said Articles read as under:-

18. For the price of work done by the Plaintiff for the defendant at his request, where no time has been fixed for payment.Three yearsWhen the work is done.

137. Any other application for which No Period of limitation is provide elsewhere in this division.Three yearsWhen th