The main legal point established in the judgment is that the period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 commences from the date when the impugned award is served on the petitioner, in compliance with the provisions of Section 31(5) of the Act.

VIBHU BAKHRU, J.

1. The petitioner (hereafter ‘DUSIB’) has filed the present petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereafter ‘the Act’) impugning the arbitral award dated 14.03.2016 (hereafter ‘the impugned award’) passed by the sole arbitrator appointed by DUSIB.

2. The first and foremost question that falls for consideration is whether the present petition is beyond the period of limitation as specified under Section 34(3) of the Act.

3. The impugned award was made on 14.03.2016 and a copy of that was forwarded by the arbitrator to both the parties. It is now admitted although was not disclosed in the petition -that a copy of the impugned award was received by DUSIB immediately thereafter (the documents handed over by respondent indicate that the copy of the impugned award was received by DUSIB on 22.03.2016). The present petition was filed on 23.08.2016.

4. In the present petition, it is asserted that the impugned award was received by DUSIB on 26.05.2016 and on the said basis DUSIB asserts that the present petition was filed within time. It is noteworthy that DUSIB has also filed the covering letter from the arbitrator forwarding a copy of the impugned award as well as an envelope in which the same was forwarded, to establish that the impugned award was received by DUSIB only on 26.05.2016.

5. The respondent has objected to this petition as being barred by limitation. The respondent during the course of hearing pointed out that DUSIB had received the impugned award much earlier on 22.03.2016; nonetheless, it sent a letter dated 24.05.2016 to the arbitrator requesting him to announce the award. In response to the same, the arbitrator once again forwarded the impugned award to DUSIB. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the letter dated 24.05.2016 was plainly mischievous as DUSIB had already received a copy of the impugned award and the said letter was written only to extend the period of limitation.

6. On the respondent contending that DUSIB had received the impugned award much earlier, DUSIB was called upon to file an affidavit.

7. In compliance with the aforesaid, an affidavit was filed on behalf of DUSIB. DUSIB did not dispute that it had received the copy of the impugned award in March, 2016. However, it contended that the period of limitation would not commence from the date of receipt of the copy of the impugned award; according to DUSIB, the said delivery did not comply with the provisions of Section 31(5) of the Act as the copy of the award forwarded by the arbitrator was not a signed copy.

8. It is at the outset necessary to observe that the impugned award was sent by the arbitrator under the cover of the letter dated 14.03.2016. The letter was signed in original, that is, in the handwriting of the arbitrator. The photocopy of the impugned award enclosed with the letter, was also stamped in original on each page, by the stamp of the arbitrator bearing his name at the place where the signatures of the arbitrator appeared. It is also relevant to mention that the copy of the impugned award received by DUSIB on 26.05.2016 -on the basis of which the present petition is filed is also a photocopy, which is similarly stamped.

9. Although it is stated in the petition that DUSIB had received the impugned award on 26.05.2016 in an envelope(a copy of which is annexed with the petition), the case subsequently set up is that DUSIB has never received a signed copy of the award and, therefore, the period of filing the petition has not begun, even as of date.

10. Thus, the principal questions to be addressed is whether the service of the award, which is made under the cover of a letter that is signed by the arbitrator and bears the original stamp of the arbitrator, is sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 31(5) of the Act and whether it is open for DUSIB to raise this contention.

11. Mr Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for DUSIB relied upon the decisions of the Suprem