Vicarious liability under Section 141 NI Act requires the accused person to be in charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the accused company at the time of the offense. Execution of guarantee deeds by a resigned director prior to the issuance of the cheques does not attract vicarious liability under Section 138/141 NI Act.

JUDGMENT

Manoj Kumar Ohri, J. - The present petitions are instituted under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on behalf of the petitioner assailing the summoning orders dated 20.01.2017 passed in CC Nos. 635667/2016 and 635666/2016, the order dated 12.04.2016 passed in CC No. 1109/2016 and the order dated 02.02.2016 passed in CC No. 4429/2015 by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-03 (NI Act), South-East District, Saket, Delhi.

2. The above-noted petitions arise out of different complaints filed under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the NI Act) and involve the same parties. Accordingly, the petitions are taken up for hearing together and shall be disposed of by a common order.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that vide the impugned orders, the petitioner has been summoned by the learned Magistrate in the aforesaid complaint cases without due application of mind. It is contended that while passing the impugned orders, learned Metropolitan Magistrate failed to appreciate that all the four cheques in question issued on behalf of respondent No. 2/company (hereinafter referred to as "the accused company") from 30.03.2014 to 31.01.2016 were signed by respondent No. 3, being the sole authorized signatory and Managing Director thereof.

4. It is further submitted that prior to the issuance of the cheques in question, the petitioner had already resigned as a Director of the accused company on 28.02.2014. In support of the submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed on record the petitioners resignation letter dated 28.02.2014, a copy of Form DIR-12 and the company master data available on the website of the Registrar of Companies.

5. It is also submitted that the only specific role assigned to the present petitioner is that at earlier point of time, he had executed personal guarantee deeds dated 17.05.2011 and 18.06.2013 in favour of the complainant company. However, after he resigned from the accused company on 28.02.2014, he had no role to play. In simple words, the petitioners case is that on the date of the alleged offence being committed, he was not in-charge of the day-to-day affairs of the accused company.

6. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1/company (hereinafter referred to as "the complainant company"), on the other hand, has supported the impugned orders. He submits that specific averments against the petitioner are evident in the complaints filed by the complainant company, wherein it is stated that the petitioner was a Director of the accused company and had executed a guarantee deed, thereby undertaking personal liability. It is also submitted that the proceedings before the Trial Court are at the nascent stage and may not be quashed at the outset.

7. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record.

8. A perusal of the records would show that on dishonour of the aforesaid cheques, demand notices dated 13.06.2014, 29.04.2014, 17.02.2016 and 21.04.2015 respectively were issued, subsequent to which the accused company failed to pay the outstanding amounts and the aforesaid criminal complaints came to be filed on 01.08.2014, 31.05.2014, 02.04.2016 and 28.05.2015 respectively.

9. Further, a reading of the aforesaid criminal complaints would show that it was alleged that while respondent No. 3 was the Managing Director of the accused company, the petitioner was a Director on the Board thereof and he alongwith respondent No. 3 was part of the senior management of the accused company and in-charge of the day-to-day business and management of the operational and financial affairs thereof. It was also alleged that cheques were usually issued by the accused company at the behest of respondent No. 3 and the petitioner with their full knowledge.

Insofar as the present petitioner is concerned, besides the aforesaid allegations, it was also claimed that he, alongwith respondent No. 3, had guaranteed repayment b