The judgment emphasizes the broad purposive construction of the Court Fees Act to extend the benefit of refund of court fees to all methods of out-of-court dispute settlement legally arrived at.

JUDGMENT

Suresh Kumar Kait, J. - The hearing has been conducted through video conferencing.

I.a. 1373/2022 (u/O. XXIII Rule 3 r/w S. 151 CPC)

1. The present application has been jointly filed by plaintiffs and defendants praying for issuance of decree in terms of prayer clause 25 (a) & (b) of the present suit and for refund of entire Court fees.

2. The captioned suit has been filed by the plaintiffs seeking permanent injunction restraining infringement of registered trademark, passing off, unfair competition, damages, delivery up, etc. against the defendant.

3. This court is informed that the plaintiffs and defendant have amicably resolved their disputes out of court, in terms as stated in Paragraph 2 of the present application.

4. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs submits that in terms of settlement, the present suit be decreed against defendant.

5. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the application and in specific contents of Para-2 thereof, this Court finds that the settlement reached between the parties is valid and lawful.

6. accordingly, the present joint application filed by the plaintiffs and defendant is allowed.

7. Needless to say, parties shall be bound by the terms of settlement reached between them.

8. The application stands disposed of accordingly.

CS(COMM) 660/2021

9. In view of order passed in Ia No. 1373/2022 (u/O XXIII Rule 3 r/w Section 151 CPC), the present suit is decreed qua defendant in terms of Paragraph No.2 of said application, i.e. I.a. 1373/2022 which shall form part of decree sheet. Decree sheet be accordingly drawn.

10. Learned counsel also submits that since the subject matter of the suit stands amicably resolved, therefore, in terms of Section 16 of the Court Fees act, the entire court fees be refunded to the plaintiffs.

11. Learned counsel for plaintiffs has relied upon judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The High Court of Judicature at Madras rep. by its Registrar General vs. M.C. Subramanium & Ors. (2021) 3 SCC 560. The relevant paras of the said judgment are reproduced as under:

'....23. We find ourselves in agreement with the approach taken by the High Courts in the decisions stated supra. The purpose of Section 69-a is to reward parties who have chosen to withdraw their litigations in favour of more conciliatory dispute settlement mechanisms, thus saving the time and resources of the Court, by enabling them to claim refund of the court fees deposited by them. Such refund of court fee, though it may not be connected to the substance of the dispute between the parties, is certainly an ancillary economic incentive for pushing them towards exploring alternative methods of dispute settlement. as the Karnataka High Court has rightly observed in Kamalamma, the parties who have agreed to settle their disputes without requiring judicial intervention under Section 89 CPC are even more deserving of this benefit. This is because by choosing to resolve their claims themselves, they have saved the State of the logistical hassle of arranging for a third-party institution to settle the dispute. Though arbitration and mediation are certainly salutary dispute resolution mechanisms, we also find that the importance of private amicable negotiation between the parties cannot be understated. In our view, there is no justifiable reason why Section 69-a should only incentivise the methods of out-of-court settlement stated in Section 89 CPC and afford step-brotherly treatment to other methods availed of by the parties.

24. admittedly, there may be situations wherein the parties have after the course of a long-drawn trial, or multiple frivolous litigations, approached the Court seeking refund of court fees in the guise of having settled their disputes. In such cases, the Court may, having regard to the previous conduct of the parties and the principles of equity, refuse to grant relief under the relevant rules pertaining to court fees. However, we do not find the present