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2022 Supreme(Del) 2044

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Najmi Waziri, Vikas Mahajan, JJ.
Bestech India Pvt. Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
IDBI Bank Ltd. - Respondent
W.P.(C) 6606 of 2019 & CM Appl. 27922 of 2019
Decided On : 27-09-2022

The law in effect at the time when the cause of action arose should govern the proceedings until the law was amended.

Headnote:

Extension of Time - Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act - Section 19(5), Section 19(5) - The court discussed the amendments made to section 19(5) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, and the subsequent changes in the time limit for filing a written statement. The court emphasized that the law in effect at the time when the cause of action arose should govern the proceedings until the law was amended. The court set aside the order of the learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and remanded the case to the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal to consider the matter afresh on the merits of the application for condonation of delay.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner's appeal against the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, which closed the petitioner's right to file a written statement due to non-compliance with the statutory time limit, was dismissed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner's application for condonation of delay was not considered.

Finding of the Court:

The court set aside the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and remanded the case to the Debt Recovery Tribunal to consider the matter afresh on the merits of the application for condonation of delay.

Issues: The main issue was the interpretation of the amendments made to section 19(5) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, and whether the law in effect at the time when the cause of action arose should govern the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that the law in effect at the time when the cause of action arose should govern the proceedings until the law was amended. The court also highlighted the need for the Debt Recovery Tribunal to consider the matter afresh on the merits of the application for condonation of delay.

Final Decision: The court set aside the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and remanded the case to the Debt Recovery Tribunal to consider the matter afresh on the merits of the application for condonation of delay.

ORDER

The hearing has been conducted through hybrid mode (physical and virtual hearing).

1. This petition impugns the order dated 04.04.2019 passed by the learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal ('DRAT') in Misc. Appeal Mo. 145/2019, dismissing the petitioner's appeal against the order of the learned Debt Recovery Tribunal ('DRT') in O.A. No. 233 of 2014, whereby the petitioner's right to file written statement was closed on account of it not being filed within the statutorily permissible time. The petitioner's application for condonation of delay was not considered.

2. On 25.02.2019, the learned DRT observed, inter-alia, as under:

    "...

    Heard, record has been thoroughly perused. In the present matter Ms. Anshul Bahal and Mr. Dincur Bajai appeared regularly on behalf of defendant and put appearance since, 16.10.2015 but despite, repeated adjournment WS not filed accordingly, Ld. Incharge of this Tribunal, vide, order dated 09.05.2017 closed the right to file WS of the defendants. It is a matter of fact that WS has to be filed within 30 days, inspite of that in the present matter already sufficient opportunity was given to the defendants as there were putting regular appearance since 16.10.2015 therefore there is no ground that the previous counsel of the defendants not informed and it is equal responsibility of the defendants to aware of the proceeding. Therefore, no ground for allowing the present application, accordingly, the present I.A. stand dismissed.

    ..."

3. The said order was impugned before the learned DRAT, which has upheld the same and recorded, inter-alia, as under:

    "...

    It is not being disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the written statement was not presented before the DRT within the statutory period of 30 days as prescribed under Section 19(5) of the RDDBFI Act. It is also not disputed that no request was made within the 30 days period for extension of time by further 15 days to enable the appellant to file the written statement. Under Section 19(5) of the Act, if request for extension of time for filing written statement is made, the DRT is empowered to extend the time but only by a further period of 15 days and nothing beyond that. In the present case, on the expiry of initial 30 days period for filing written statement, the defence automatically stood struck off and there was nothing for the DRT to pass any separate order and that, too, after many months of expiry of initial period of 30 days. The statute has created a bar against filing of written statement by a defendant in the O.A. once initial 30 days period expires and no extension is sought. In a recent judgement passed by the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Crest Steel and Power Private Limited & Ors. vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (Misc. Petition No.2271/2018, decided on 10.5.2018) also it has been categorically held that the DRT has no power to extend the period for filing of the written statement, therefore, whether or not the appellant's earlier counsel, if at all he was grossly negligent, had caused damage to the interest of the appellant resulting in striking off the defence of the appellant in the O.A., that fact is totally irrelevant. The proceedings under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act have to be finalised within a period of six months and in case such prayers, as is made in the present case by the appellant, are entertained casually, the entire purpose of prescribing outer time limit for disposal of the O.A. will be defeated.

    ..."

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the said order is erroneous insofar as it has construed the law as putting a bar on the extension of time, when infact under the then extant law there was no such bar. She submits that an application for review of order dated 09.05.2017 was filed in September 2017. It is, however, noted that appearance on behalf of the petitioner was put in since 16.10.2015.

5. When the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions

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