The limited scope of interference in appeals filed under Section 30 of the Employees' Compensation Act and the material issues that arise for the just decision of the Commissioner in a claim petition under the Act.

JUDGMENT

Manoj Kumar Ohri, J. (Oral)

CM APPL. 10702/2023 (Exemption)

Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

Application stands disposed of.

FAO 50/2023 and CM APPL. 10701/2023 (Interim Stay)

1. By way of the present appeal filed under Section 30 of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter, referred to as the `EC Act'), the appellant seeks setting aside of the order dated 23.12.2022 passed by the learned Commissioner, Employees' Compensation in Case No. CEC-D/NE/41/2018/324, vide which respondent No.1/claimant was awarded death compensation in respect of his son.

2. The facts, in nutshell, are that in the claim application, it was averred by the claimant that his son Ajay Kumar alongwith other laborers was engaged in the work of taking down tin shed for the appellant at his factory. He was paid Rs.500/- per day. On 16.04.2018, the appellant had called Ajay Kumar along with two other labourers to carry out the said work. Before carrying out the work, Ajay Kumar had asked the appellant to arrange safety equipment. Though the appellant promised to provide the same, he failed to fulfill his promise. At about 02:30 PM, Ajay Kumar slipped from a ladder and fell. He was taken to J.P.C Hospital, Delhi by two persons i.e., Faizan and Veer Singh, from where he was referred to G.T.B Hospital. At the latter hospital, Ajay Kumar was declared `brought dead'.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned order by contending that the claimant had shown a residential address in the claim petition, as opposed to the address of a factory. It is further contended that the appellant had asked proprietor of respondent No.2/M/s Ayan Khan Fabricators, i.e. Faizan to carry out the removal of tin shed and the deceased was working with respondent No.2. As such, the deceased was not employee of the present appellant and it was only respondent No.2 who was liable to pay compensation.

4. At the outset, it is deemed expedient to outline the scope of appeal filed under Section 30 of the EC Act as delineated in North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Sujatha reported as (2019) 11 SCC 514. In the captioned case, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the scope of interference in an appeal filed under Section 30 of EC Act is limited to substantial questions of law and findings of facts proved either way, are not to be likely interfered with. Relevant excerpt from the decision is reproduced hereunder:

"9. At the outset, we may take note of the fact, being a settled principle, that the question as to whether the employee met with an accident, whether the accident occurred during the course of employment, whether it arose out of an employment, how and in what manner the accident occurred, who was negligent in causing the accident, whether there existed any relationship of employee and employer, what was the age and monthly salary of the employee, how many are the dependents of the deceased employee, the extent of disability caused to the employee due to injuries suffered in an accident, whether there was any insurance coverage obtained by the employer to cover the incident etc. are some of the material issues which arise for the just decision of the Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee suffers any bodily injury or dies during the course of his employment and he/his LRs sue(s) his employer to claim compensation under the Act.

10. The aforementioned questions are essentially the questions of fact and therefore, they are required to be proved with the aid of evidence. Once they are proved either way, the findings recorded thereon are regarded as the findings of fact.

11. The appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner lies only against the specific orders set out in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 30 of the Act with a further rider contained in the first proviso to the section that the appeal must involve substantial questions of law.

12. In other words, the appeal pro