The main legal principle established in the judgment is that similarly placed persons challenging termination orders should be treated alike, and the benefit of a judgment should be extended to them, in line with the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

JUDGMENT

V. Kameswar Rao, J. (Oral)

CM APPL. 45858/2022

1. This application has been filed by the applicant Harmesh Choudhary with following prayers:

"It is therefore, most respectfully, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to:

(a) Issue appropriate directions to the official respondents to extend the benefit of judgment dated 16.01.2020 passed by this Hon'ble Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No.11973/2016, to the applicants/respondents thereby reinstating them and treating them at par with the petitioners; and/or

(b) Pass any other order, as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice."

2. The facts as noted from the application are that the petitioner along with 65 other similarly placed persons had filed an Original Application being OA 2910/2015 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (`Tribunal., for short) primarily challenging various termination orders issued on June 24, 2015. The OA was dismissed by the Tribunal vide order dated August 30, 2016. The said judgment of the Tribunal became a subject matter of challenge before this Court in a writ petition being W.P.(C) 11973/2016 decided on January 16, 2020, whereby this Court had set aside the order of the Tribunal dated August 30, 2016 and directed the reinstatement of the petitioners who had filed the writ petition, within a period of eight weeks, however by following the principle of `no work no pay..

3. It may be stated here that the applicant herein was not the petitioner in that writ petition. As he was an applicant in the Original Application, he was impleaded as performa respondent No.8.

4. The judgment of this Court dated January 16, 2020 became a subject matter of a Special Leave Petition being SLP 12311/2020, filed by the official respondents herein, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The effect thereof is that the order dated January 16, 2020 became final.

5. The submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is all the petitioners before this Court were given the benefit of the judgment of this Court dated January 16, 2020. He submits, though the applicant herein was an applicant before the Tribunal, but had not challenged the judgment and as such was not a petitioner before this Court. Therefore, the benefit of the Judgment of this Court dated January 16, 2020, was not given to him as he has not been reinstated though he is similarly placed like the petitioners in the writ petition.

6. His plea is that the applicant was under a bona fide belief that the benefit of the order of this Court shall also be given to him. In fact, after the dismissal of the SLP, a legal notice dated July 2, 2022 was served on the respondents for compliance of the order passed this Court in favour of the applicant. The respondents replied to the applicant stating that the benefit cannot be given to him was he was not amongst the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petition. He submits that the applicant was also part of the omnibus termination order dated June 24, 2015 which has already been set aside by this Court and the petitioners who are similarly placed like the applicant have been reinstated.

7. He states that the judgment of this Court is applicable to all similarly placed persons whose services have been terminated on June 24, 2015 and on mere technicality, the benefit should not be denied to the applicant herein. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the judgment in the case of State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, to contend that any judgment in rem should be made applicable to similarly placed persons and all such persons should not be made to rush to the Court seeking benefit thereof.

8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that, as the applicant was not the petitioner before this Court, he is not entitled to the benefit, though he do concede to the fact that the applicant is simil