ORDER

1. The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 9th November, 2000 passed by the learned Additional District Judge in RCA No. 28/1998.

2. The dispute in this case is with regard to the demand dated 2nd June, 1990 issued by the respondent in respect of consumption of electricity by the appellant for the period from 10th February, 1984 to March, 1987.

3. An inspection was carried out in the premises of the appellant on 10th February, 1987 and it was found that the appellant was consuming much more electricity than what was sanctioned. On this basis, a demand was sent to the appellant and this was challenged by filing a suit bearing No. 429/1994 in which the appellant prayed for a mandatory and permanent injunction challenging the impugned demand as well as the threat of disconnection of electricity.

4. By a judgment and decree dated 25th November, 1998, the learned Civil Judge decreed the suit but this was set aside in appeal by the impugned judgment and decree.

5. The issues that were framed in the case are as follows:

"(i) Whether the suit is not maintainable for want of notice under Section 478 of the DMC Act?

(ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief?

(iii) Relief."

6. For the purpose of the present appeal, the first issue is not material. What is really in controversy is the second issue.

7. According to learned Counsel for the appellant, the demand was time- barred and, in any case, no show-cause notice was issued before raising the demand.

8. As far as the question of the demand being time-barred is concerned, that is now no longer res integra in view of the judgment of this Court particularly in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (DESU) v. H.D. Shourie, 53(1994) DLT 1 (DB). It has been held in this case affirming the judgment of a learned Single Judge in H.D. Shourie v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1987 (Delhi) 219, that the provisions of Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 make it clear that a consumer has to pay for the electricity that is consumed from the moment of consumption. However, a demand for payment can be made much later. There is time-limit for raising a demand but if a suit for recovery is filed to recover the demanded amount, it has to be filed within the period of limitation.

9. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said, by any stretch of imagination, that the demand raised in the case of the appellant was barred by time. If the respondents were to recover the money by filing a suit, the period of limitation would start from the date of raising the demand but that situation has not arisen so far as present appeal is concerned.

10. As regards the issuance of notice to the appellant, both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that a notice was duly sent to the appellant. There is no occasion to disturb this concurrent finding of fact.

11. No substantial question of law has been made out by the appellant. Dismissed.