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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Badar Durrez Ahmed, R.V. Easwar, JJ.
NTPC Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax - Respondent
W.P. (C) 14458 of 2006 W.P. (C) 15688 of 2006 W.P. (C) 15693 of 2006 W.P. (C) 15714 of 2006
Decided On : 07-03-2013




JUDGMENT

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J. (Oral)--These writ petitions are in respect of notices issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking to reopen concluded assessments under Section 147 of the said Act. These petitions pertain to the assessment years 1999-2000, 2001-02, 2002-03 and 2003-04. All the impugned Section 148 notices were issued on 03.02.2006. Insofar as the assessment year 1999-2000 (pertaining to writ petition No.15693/2006) is concerned, the assessment is a proposed to be reopened after a lapse of four years from the end of the assessment year and therefore, the proviso to Section 147 would have to be considered. Insofar as the other three writ petitions are concerned, the proposed reopening is within the period of four years and, therefore, the issues relevant for the invocation of the proviso to Section 147 of the said Act would not require any consideration. It may be pointed out that in respect of the very same petitioner, virtually identical issues had come up for consideration before this Court in respect of the assessment year 2000-01. That writ petition was numbered as WP(C) 14562/2006 and a detailed judgment has been delivered on 10.01.2013 whereby the notice under Section 148 has been quashed and proceedings pursuant thereto have also been quashed.

2. We find that the said decision in WP(C) 14562/2006, inter alia, held that there was no failure on the part of the petitioner to fully and truly disclose all material particulars necessary for its assessment and, therefore, the condition precedent stipulated in the proviso to Section 147 had not been satisfied. As a result of which, the propond reopening beyond the period of four years was impermissible in law. In addition to the above conclusion, this Court also held that the issuance of the notices under Section 148 of the said Act, in the facts and circumstances of the case, would amount to nothing but a mere change of opinion. This finding is apparent from paragraph 37 of the said decision wherein the following observations are made:

"The petitioner had disclosed fully and truly the entire process of manufacture and generation of electricity by the gas turbine unit as well as by the steam turbine unit. It was not as if it was a fact or a figure hidden in some books of accounts which the Assessing Officer could have, with due diligence, discovered but had not done so. The Assessing Officer had asked specific queries with regard to the manner of functioning of the two units and the petitioner had provided detailed answers. All facts were staring the Assessing Officer at his face. He could have drawn his own inferences and, in fact, he did by treating them as separate units. On the very same facts, he is now trying to draw a different set of inferences which is nothing but a mere change of opinion. The inspection report of September, 2004 does not indicate anything new. While considering the fuel cost argument in the earlier assessment year, when the matter travelled right up to the Tribunal, the entire factual position was examined by the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) as well as by the Tribunal and also by the Committee on Disputes and the two units were treated as separate units. We have already extracted the relevant portion of the Tribunal's order which notices the same. Therefore, in our view, this is not a case where the assessee/ petitioner can be said to have failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment in respect of the assessment year 2000-01. Thus, this by itself, is sufficient for us to conclude that the exception carved out in the proviso to Section 147 is not attracted and, therefore, there is a bar from taking action under Section 147 inasmuch as the period of four years has expired. The impugned notice dated 03.02.2006 is, therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground."

(underlining added)

It is apparent from the above that apart from the issue of full and true d

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