JUDGMENT

R.V. Easwar, J. C.M. No.16860/2013 is an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking "modification" of the order dated 24.04.2012 passed by a Division Bench consisting Sanjiv Khanna, J. and one of us (R.V. Easwar, J.) in LPA No.16/2012. C.M. No.2392/2013 is again an application under Section 151 CPC seeking "clarification" of the above order passed by the Division Bench. When these applications were earlier placed before this Bench, it was felt by this Bench that it would be appropriate to place these applications before the same Bench which heard the Letters Patent Appeal; they were accordingly placed before the same Bench which decided the LPA. However, since by orders dated 10.01.2014 and 28.02.2014, Sanjiv Khanna, J. recused himself from hearing the applications, they were again placed before this Bench. Accordingly arguments were heard on both the applications. The submission in the "modification" application is that the opening sentence of paragraph 73(v) of the order dated 24.04.2012 be modified. The said paragraph open as follows:-

"73(v) Till the decision, there will be stay of the pending proceedings or initiation of new proceedings before the High Court and in the District Courts."

The application for modification states that the appellant is not interested in such protection and to this limited extent the said paragraph may be modified. It is claimed that the respondents cannot possibly have any objection to this since they themselves are praying for certain matters to be proceeded with (against the appellant) and that in any case the modification is eminently warranted because of the change in circumstances, that is to say that the appellant-applicant is now a member of the Bar w. e. f. 30.07.2013 and is, therefore, statutorily entitled to appear for others and if that is so there can be no bar against appearing for himself. It is also clarified in the application for modification that the application is without prejudice to the basic position taken by the appellant-applicant that the order dated 24.04.2012 is a nullity in law, void ab initio and non est. It is accordingly prayed that the opening sentence of para 73(v) reproduced above may be deleted.

2. In the application for clarification, the gist of the contention is that Section 41(b) and (d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preclude this Court from injuncting the prosecution of proceedings other than before a subordinate Court if those proceedings are of a criminal nature and though the impugned order refers to the statutory provisions, it has nevertheless proceeded to ignore the true purport of those provisions in injuncting the applicant in the manner directed by the Division Bench. The prayer in the application is that the Court should clarify that in light of the statutory bar placed upon the Court by Section 41(b) and (d) of the Specific Relief Act, the impugned order staying all proceedings between the parties does not extend to original criminal proceedings or proceedings in a criminal matter, or proceedings arising therefrom nor is the Division Bench right in staying proceedings pending before any Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. A list of the cases which according to the applicant should not be affected by the order passed by the Division Bench is given in Annexure-2 and 3, Annexure-2 being a list of criminal matters and Annexure-3 being a list of matters pending before the coordinate Bench of this Court.

3. In support of the application for modification, the applicant who appeared in person contended that paragraph 73(v) in the impugned order would indicate that the stay was granted by this Court, and not imposed, only to protect the interest of the Khosla group and if the Khosla group does not want such stay and is not interested in such protection, the Court ought not to have imposed the stay. In support of the application for clarification, it is contended by the applicant that there is no authority ve