The court emphasized the priority of contractual obligations over equitable claims, upholding an interim order that denied extension for vacating premises based on lease terms.

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

CMs No.7613/2021 & 7614/2021 in FAO(OS)(COMM) 34/2021 & CMs No.7616/2021 & 7617/2021 in FAO(OS)(COMM) 35/2021 (all for exemption)

1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions and as per extant rules.

2. The applications are disposed of.

FAO(OS) (COMM) 34/2021 & CM No.7612/2021 (for ad-interim relief) & FAO(OS) (COMM) 35/2021 & CM No.7615/2021 (for ad-interim relief)

3. The appeals impugn the common order dated 16th February, 2021 of the Commercial Division of this Court in O.M.P.(I)(COMM) No.60/2021 and O.M.P.(I)(COMM) No.61/2021, both preferred by the appellant, under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with respect to arbitration clause in the License Agreement dated 4th August, 2009 and Lease Agreement dated 13th August, 2010 between the appellant and the respondent East Delhi Municipal Corporation (EDMC). The appellant, vide the said applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act sought interim measure of restraining the respondent EDMC from acting upon its letter/office order dated 2nd February, 2021 directing the appellant to vacate "the subject premises" by 18th February, 2021. Vide the impugned order, the Commercial Division has partly allowed the Section 9 applications by extending "the date for completion of the divestment process" till 4th March, 2021. It is the contention of the appellant that the appellant, in accordance with the Lease Agreement and License Agreement, is entitled to time of four months for vacation and/or for completion of the divestment process and in these appeals seeks the said time of four months.

4. The counsel for the respondent EDMC appears on advance notice and considering the urgency expressed, we have heard the senior counsels for the appellant and the counsel for the respondent EDMC finally on these appeals.

5. We may at the outset observe that the scope of interference in appeals under Section 37 , the context of Section 37 (1)(c), has been held to be much restricted. As far as appeals under Section 37 (1)(b), as the present appeals are, are concerned, since the order appealed against is an interim order, which is largely discretionary, the law laid down in |Wander Ltd. Vs. Antox India (P) Ltd. 1990 (Supp.) SCC 727| relating to scope and power of Appellate Court in appeals against interim order, would apply and interference with the discretion exercised by the Court at the first instance would be permissible only when discretion is shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where the Court has ignored the settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of interim orders.

Reference may be made to judgment dated 27th November, 2020 in FAO(OS)(COMM) No.136/2019 titled |Sepco Electric Power Construction Corporation Vs. Power Mech Projects Limited.:

6. Under the License Agreement dated 4th August, 2009, the Ghazipur Slaughter House was licensed by the erstwhile Municipal Corporation of Delhi to the appellant, with effect from 4th August, 2009, for a period of ten years. The Carcass Utilization-cum-Rendering Plant was also leased out to the appellant, from 13th August, 2010, initially for a period of five years and which was further extended from 13th August, 2015 upto 3rd August, 2019, to be co-terminus with the lease of the Ghazipur Slaughter House. The lease was extended from 4th August, 2019 to 3rd February, 2020 and thereafter from 4th February, 2020 to 3rd May, 2020 and yet again from 4th May, 2020 to 3rd May, 2022 or till finalisation of tender, whichever is earlier. Tenders were invited by the respondent EDMC and the