Disciplinary proceedings must be concluded expeditiously, and both parties bear responsibility for delays; the respondent's participation is essential for a just resolution.

JUDGMENT

Rajiv Shakdher, J.: (ORAL)

[Court hearing convened via video-conferencing on account of COVID-19]

W.P.(C) 3908/2020 & CM APPL. 13982/2020 [Application filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking stay on the operation of the impugned order dated 17.12.2019]

CM APPL. 22509/2020 [Application filed on behalf of the respondent no. 1 seeking vacation of the interim order dated 02.07.2020]

CM APPL. 17627/2021 [Application filed on behalf of the respondent no. 1 seeking implementation of the impugned order dated 17.12.2019]

1. With the consent of the counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for hearing and final disposal.

2. Mr. M. K. Bhardwaj, who appears on behalf of respondent no.1, says that, the respondent no.1 is aggrieved by the fact that the suspension order has been extended from time to time without due application of mind.

2.1. The record shows that, a sexual harassment complaint was filed against respondent no. 1, on 08.09.2017, which was received, in the office of petitioner no. 3 i.e. Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of NCT of Delhi, on 14.09.2017. This was followed by FIR No. 0415/2017, dated 09.09.2017, alleging commission of offences under Section 354/354(A)/506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The said FIR was registered against respondent no.1 with P.S. Jahangir Puri.

2.2. The respondent no.1 was, around this time, placed under suspension, i.e., on 13.09.2017.

2.3. The record also shows [qua which there is no dispute] that, the period of suspension was extended thereafter, vide orders dated, 11.12.2017, 08.06.2018, 07.09.2018, and 03.12.2018.

2.4. It is, at this point in time, that respondent no.1 moved the Central Administrative Tribunal (in short `the Tribunal'). The Tribunal, via the impugned order dated 17.12.2019, passed in O.A./100/860/2019, has directed the petitioners to reinstate respondent no. 1.

2.5. The petitioners, being aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, have approached this court by way of the instant writ petition.

3. According to Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, who appears on behalf of the petitioners, the respondent no. 1 did not join the enquiry conducted by the Internal Complaints Committee (`ICC'), on at least four occasions, which led to the ICC recommending that the enquiry should be conducted at a "higher level". This aspect emerges upon the perusal of the ICC report dated 11.11.2017.

3.1. It is also Mrs. Ahlawat's contention [and qua that there is no dispute] that, a charge memo was, accordingly, served on respondent no. 1 on 30.11.2017.

3.2. The record further discloses that respondent no. 1 assailed the aforementioned charge memo by approaching the Tribunal by way of yet another action i.e. O.A./100/3059/2018. The Tribunal, via interlocutory order dated 14.08.2018, stayed further disciplinary proceedings qua respondent no. 1.

3.3. A perusal of the impugned order dated 17.12.2019 would show that the Tribunal not only disposed of respondent no. 1's action against the suspension order dated 13.09.2017 but also disposed of O.A./100/3059/2018, albeit, via a separate order, which is also dated 17.12.2019.

3.4. The net result is that, while the Tribunal has rejected respondent no. 1's challenge, to the charge memo dated 30.11.2017, it has directed the petitioners to forthwith reinstate respondent no. 1 in service.

4. The abovementioned course, does not find favour with us, as would be evident, from the circumstances set out hereinabove.

4.1. Both the parties have contributed to the delay in the disciplinary proceedings being carried out with due expedition. Although, the petitioners did exten