The High Court cannot quash an FIR when specific allegations exist and the investigation is incomplete, affirming that inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly.

Headnote:(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 376, 377, 323, and 34 - Quashing of FIR - Petition seeks quashing of FIR based on allegations of rape, unnatural sexual intercourse, and hurt against the petitioners - Court emphasizes that investigation is ongoing, and charges have not been filed, thus, the FIR cannot be quashed at this stage - Allegations are not demonstrated to be false or vindictive based on current evidence - The petitioner has failed to join the investigation, and non-bailable warrants have been issued. (Paras 3, 11, 13, and 15)

(B) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent powers of High Court - The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be applied sparingly and only when allegations are manifestly false or baseless - It is stated that the power should not be exercised when investigation is incomplete and charge-sheet is not filed. (Paras 10, 11, and 12)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner sought quashing of FIR No. 378/2022 alleging his involvement in rape and other offenses. The allegations stem from a matrimonial dispute with claims of harm and sexual abuse made against the petitioners. It is noted that the FIR contains specific allegations against each accused. (Paras 4-5)

Findings of Court:
The Court found that specific allegations in the FIR raised doubts about a prima facie case and determined that it is premature to quash the FIR as the investigation is ongoing and no charge-sheet has been filed yet. (Paras 11-13)

Issues: The Court addressed whether it is appropriate to quash an FIR when the investigation is not complete and specific allegations have been made against the accused. (Paras 12-13)

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the power to quash the FIR cannot be exercised lightly when investigations are ongoing, and there are specific allegations against the accused, asserting that premature dismissal of the FIR would undermine the investigative process. (Paras 12-15)

Result: Petition dismissed.

Table of Content
1. filing of fir based on complaint. (Para 3 , 4)
2. arguments on the nature of allegations. (Para 5 , 6)
3. state's opposition and context. (Para 7 , 8)
4. principles for quashing an fir. (Para 10 , 11)
5. circumstances for dismissing the petition. (Para 12 , 13 , 14)
6. court's final ruling. (Para 15)

JUDGMENT

Swarana Kanta Sharma, J.

CRL.M.A. 15261/2022 (exemption)

1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

2. Application stands disposed of.

W.P. CRL. 1762/2022 & CRL. M.A. 15262/2022

3. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking quashing of FIR No. 378/2022 (Impugned FIR) registered under Sections 376/377/323/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), at P.S. Begumpur, on merits.

4. The Impugned FIR was registered on a complaint made by respondent no. 2 wherein it is alleged that petitioner no. 1 (husband of respondent no. 2) was addicted to drugs and on a specific day, petitioner no. 1 came with his friends and asked respondent no. 2 to make physical relations with his friends. Thereafter, petitioner no. 1 left the house, around 3 years ago and visited home sometimes. It is also alleged in the FIR that in the absence of petitioner no.1, petitioner no. 4 forcefully established physical relations and even had unnatural sexual intercourse with her. When respondent no. 2 resisted petitioner no. 4, she was badly beaten and threatened. It is also stated that when respondent no. 2 informed her mother-in-law about the aforementioned incidents, the mother-in-law, along with her brother-in-law, also threatened respondent no. 2 with dire consequences. Thus, the FIR was registered on the basis of complaint filed by the complainant alleging offence of rape under Section 376 IPC, unnatural sexual intercourse under Section 377 IPC and hurt under Section 323 IPC against the accused persons where specific allegations were made against each accused.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that charge-sheet has not been filed in the above-noted FIR. It is submitted that the present case pertains to a matrimonial dispute with regard to the amount of maintenance to be paid by petitioner no.1 to respondent no. 2 and the same has been given the colour of a criminal offence to exert pressure on the petitioners. It is further submitted that the allegations levelled against the father-in-law and husband of the respondent no. 2 are not tenable since petitioner no. 1has been residing separately for the last 8 years and has not been in a marital relationship with respondent no. 2 for the last 15 years. It is also submitted that the sister of respondent no. 2 has been harassing petitioner no. 1.

6. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the allegation of wrongful confinement is untrue as the CCTV footage is contradictory to the allegations levelled by respondent no. 2 in the FIR and that in the said dispute, except petitioner no.1, all other petitioners are on bail. The learned counsel for the petitioners also brought to the notice of the court that the notice for joining investigation was served at the wrong address i.e., at the residence of the complainant and not at the address where petitioner no. 1 was residing. In order to buttress the claims, the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the following judgments:

a) State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., [(1992) SUPP (1) SCC 335]

b) Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., [(1998) 5 SCC 749]

c) G. Sagar Suri & Anr. Vs. State of U.P., [(2000) 2 SCC 636]

d) Indian Oil Corporation, [(2006) 6 SCC 736]

Through the above-mentioned judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the power of the High Courts under Article 226 and Section 438 Cr.P.C. can be used to quash an FIR whenever a High Court is of the view that the allegations levelled by the complainant are without merit and there is no possibility of the alleged offence having been committed, it should not wait for the Magistrate to discharge th