Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is maintained only when a private dispute involves a public law element; the petitioner was entitled to re-employment under statutory provisions.

Headnote:(A) Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 - Rule 110(2) - Service matters regarding private unaided schools - The petitioner, a post-graduate teacher, sought re-employment post-retirement until 30 April 2025 - Court found petition maintainable as it was governed by statutory provisions. (Paras 2-10)

(B) Public Law Element - Court held writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is applicable only when a public law element is involved, not for purely private contractual relationships. (Paras 7, 10)

(C) Right to Relief - Petitioner entitled to re-employment; School directed to comply with Rule 110(2) and provide benefits from the date of superannuation. (Paras 12-14)

(D) Costs - The Court imposed costs on the School for litigation, as it was deemed unnecessary. (Para 14)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner turned 60 on 30.11.2024 and made representations for re-employment as per the statutory rules. The school initially communicated her termination prompting the writ petition.

Findings of Court:
The exception to maintainability as noted in previous judgments was applicable, allowing the petition.

Result: Petition allowed, and the School directed to re-employ the petitioner until 30.04.2025 with costs. (Paras 12-15).

JUDGMENT :

JALAN PRATEEK JALAN, J.

W.P. (C) 15997/2024 & CM APPL. 5411/2025 (for directions)

1. The petitioner, who was appointed as a Post-Graduate Teacher in Chemistry in the respondent No.1-School [“the School”], has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking re-employment until 30.04.2025 in terms of the proviso to Rule 110(2) of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 [“the Rules/DSEAR”].

2. The petitioner was appointed to the said post on 20.07.1998. Even though such a stipulation was perhaps unnecessary, the appointment letter [Annexure P-2 to the writ petition] contained an express provision that the terms and conditions of her appointment are governed by DSEAR.

3. The present case concerns the retirement age stipulated in Rule 110 of the Rules. The relevant provision is Rule 110(2), which is set out below:-

“110. Retirement age – xxxx xxxx xxxx

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), every teacher, laboratory assistant, Librarian, Principal or Vice-Principal employed in such school shall continue to hold office until he attains the age of 60 years:

Provided that where a teacher, Principal or Vice-Principal attains the age of superannuation on or after the 1st day of November of any year, such teacher, Principal or Vice-Principal shall be re- employed upto the 30th day of April of the year immediately following. [Emphasis supplied]

4. The petitioner attained the age of 60 years on 30.11.2024. In terms of the proviso to Rule 110(2), she addressed a representation to the Officiating Principal of the School on 27.10.2024, seeking re- employment until 30.04.2025. She made a further representation on 14.11.2024 [Annexure P-5 to the writ petition], after receiving a communication dated 04.11.2024 [Annexure P-4 to the writ petition], stating that she would superannuate on 30.11.2024.

5. I have heard Ms. Indrani Ghosh, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Sudarshan Rajan, learned counsel for the School.

6. The only objection taken by Mr. Rajan concerns maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. He submits that the judgments of the Supreme Court in St. Mary’s Education Society and Anr. v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava and Ors. , (2023) 4 SCC 498 and Army Welfare Education Society, New Delhi v. Sunil Kumar Sharma & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1683, make it clear that service matters regarding private unaided schools are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court.

7. The discussion on this aspect, and the conclusions of the Court, are contained in the following extracts of the judgment in St. Mary’s [Supra (Note 4)]:-

“54. Thus, the aforesaid order passed by this Court makes it very clear that in a case of retirement and in case of termination, no public law element is involved. This Court has held that a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against a private educational institution shall be maintainable only if a public law element is involved and if there is no public law element is involved, no writ lies.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

66. Merely because a writ petition can be maintained against the private individuals discharging the public duties and/or public functions, the same should not be entertained if the enforcement is sought to be secured under the realm of a private law. It would not be safe to say that the moment the private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction then every dispute concerning the said private institution is amenable to writ jurisdiction. It largely depends upon the nature of the dispute and the enforcement of the right by an individual against such institution. The right which purely originates from a private law cannot be enforced taking aid of the writ jurisdiction irrespective of the fact that such institution is discharging the public duties and/or public functions. The scope of the mandamus is basically limited to an enforcement of the public duty and, therefore, it is an ardent duty of the court to find out whether the nature of