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HARYANA STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES
REDRESSAL COMMISSION, CHANDIGARH
Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President; Mrs. Basanti Devi,
Member; Mr. S. Kulwant Singh, Member
SURINDER KUMAR—Complainant
versus
M/S. ESCORTS LTD. & ANR.—Opposite Parties
Complaint Case No. 73 of 1992 — Decided on 12.1.1993

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Complainant:Mr. Des Raj Bansal, Advocate.
For the Opposite Parties:Mr. P.S. Chohan, Advocate.

The purchase of a tractor for agricultural purposes is not a "commercial purpose" under Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Headnote:

AGRICULTURAL PURPOSE - NOT COMMERCIAL PURPOSE - CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986 - SECTION 2(1)(D)(I) - PURCHASE OF TRACTOR FOR AGRICULTURAL PURPOSE - NOT COMMERCIAL PURPOSE - PRELIMINARY OBJECTION DISMISSED.

Fact of the Case:

The complainant purchased an Escort-335 tractor on July 8, 1991, which suffered from manufacturing and mechanical defects. The opposite parties raised a preliminary objection that the complaint was not maintainable under Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as the tractor was purchased for a commercial purpose.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the phrase "commercial purpose" in Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, must be interpreted in its generic sense and that "agriculture" is a genus distinct from "commerce". Therefore, "commercial purpose" and "agricultural purpose" are genetically different.

Issues: Whether the purchase of a tractor for agricultural purposes is a "commercial purpose" under Section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, was intended to protect consumers, including those engaged in agricultural activities. Interpreting "commercial purpose" broadly would exclude a large class of agricultural consumers from the Act's protection. Additionally, the court found that the tests of "large-scale commercial activity" and "direct nexus" to profit-making activity are difficult to apply in the context of agricultural purposes.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the preliminary objection and held that the complaint could proceed to trial on the merits.

ORDER

Mr. Justice S.S. Sandhawalia, President — Whether ‘commercial purpose’ is a thing apart and distinct from ‘agricultural purpose’, is the threshold core question in this complaint.

2. For the limited purpose of disposing of the preliminary jurisdictional objection, it is unnecessary to delve into the facts and merits deeply. It suffices to mention that the primal grievance of the complainant is with regard to the defective supply of an Escort-335 tractor on the 8th of July, 1991. It is the case that the said tractor from its very inception and subsequently suffered from manufacturing and mechanical defects which rendered it a non- standard and non-working machinery. In the reply filed by the opposite party No. 2, the threshold preliminary objection is in the following terms:—

“that the present complaint is not maintainable in view of Section 2(1)(d)(i) as the tractor was purchased for commercial purpose.”

To the same tenor is the stand taken by opposite party No. 1.

3. In the replication filed by the complainant, the preliminary objection has been controverted in the following terms: —

“The complainant has never used the tractor for commercial purpose. The tractor has been used and is being used for agricultural operation. The family of the complainant has a holding of 12 acres in village Sheonkra (Tarawari) in District Karnal and the tractor is being used for agricultural operation for self- employment.”

4. Mr. P.S. Chohan, the learned Counsel for the opposite parties has stuck to his guns on the point of the preliminary objection. It was contended that the very fact of the purchase of an equipment like an expensive tractor and the admitted holding of about 12 acres by the complainant would render the purchase thereof as one for a commercial purpose. The submission was that the complainant could not possibly be carrying on the agricultural operation for his mere subsistence but also would be marketing at least some part of his produce. On this premise, the stand is that the complainant is not a consumer because such an agricultural purpose is synonymous with a commercial one.

5. There is no manner of doubt that the issue raised herein has national remifications within the consumer jurisdiction. In sum, the question is whether the vast arena of agricultural purposes (and admittedly in a primarily agricultural country like ours) is outside the pale of the beneficient Consumer Protection Act. This issue therefore, deserves examination in some depth and even at the cost of some prolixity. More so because of some recent serious conflict of views and precedent thereon already.

6. Before entering the thicket of the case law it is indeed necessary and refreshing to examine the question on the language of the statute and upon larger principle. Inevitably one must first advert to the relevant part of the definition of a consumer of goods around which the controversy revolves:

“2(1)(d)(i) “Consumer means any person who, buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose: or"

7. It seems somewhat elementary that in the particular context of goods obtained for an agricultural purpose, the question of its immediate or approximate re-sale would hardly if ever arises at all. In the light of the underlined words in the definition one has to first recall the authoritative case of I (1991) CPJ 499 (NC), Synco Textiles Pvt. Ltd. v. Greaves Cotton & Company Ltd. Therein, it was pointedly observed by V. Balakrishna Eradi, J. that since re-sale of the goods has been separately and specifically mentioned in the earlier part of the definiti






































































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