NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, NEW DELHI
D.K. Jain President; Mrs. Vineeta Rai and Vinay Kumar, Members
M/s. State India Express (Regd.) — Appellant
versus
M/s. Ranutrol Ltd. & Anr. —Respondents
First Appeal No. 780 of 2006 & First Appeal No. 116 of 2007
Decided on 18.11.2013

IMPORTANT POINT
Question of limitation is a question of law which can be raised at any stage of pending proceedings.

Headnote:Consumer Protection Act, 1986—Section 24-A—Courier service—Non-delivery of goods—Complaint—Limitation—Compensation of Rs.4,54,272/- and cost of Rs.10,000/- awarded by State Commission—Neither in written statement filed on behalf of Courier nor during course of hearing before State Commission, objection as to Complaint being time-barred was raised—However, question of limitation is a question of law which can be raised at any stage of pending proceedings—As a matter of law, Section 24-A mandates that before admitting complaint all Fora must examine whether or not complaint under the Act has been preferred within two years from date on which cause of action has arisen—Cause of action on the basis of which complaint was filed, was alleged default on part of Courier in allegedly delivering goods to consignee—Cause of action arose on that date and period of limitation for the purpose of Section 24-A began to run from that date—Complaint preferred by Complainant was clearly barred by limitation and in absence of application for condonation of delay it could not be admitted for adjudication—In absence of any prayer question of grant of opportunity to Complainant to seek condonation of delay in filing complaint does not arise—Impugned order of State Commission set aside and complaint dismissed.

       Held: Before dealing with the question, it is necessary to note that neither in the written statement filed on behalf of the Courier nor during the course of hearing before the State Commission, objection as to the Complaint being time-barred was raised. Hence, the State Commission had no occasion to deal with the question. Nevertheless, the question of limitation being a question of law which can be raised at any stage of pending proceedings, we are of the opinion that in light of the provision in Section 24A of the Act, it is obligatory on our part to examine the issue irrespective of the fact as to whether such a plea had been raised before the State Commission. Moreover, there is no dispute on facts, material for determination of the question of limitation. Section 24A of the Act prescribes limitation period for admission of a complaint by the Consumer Fora. (Paras 12, 13)

       Therefore, as a matter of law, Section 24-A of the Act mandates that before admitting a complaint, all the forums, constituted under the Act, must examine whether or not the complaint under the Act has been preferred within two years from the date on which “the cause of action” has arisen.

       The term “cause of action” has not been defined in the Act. Therefore, the term has to be interpreted keeping in view the context in which it has been used in the Act and the meaning assigned to it by judicial pronouncements. In Kandimalla Raghavaiah & Co. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. (supra) explaining the meaning and import of the term “ cause of action” the Supreme Court.

        Thus, the term “cause of action” is cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit, which obviously has to be decided on the facts of each case. It has now to be seen as to when, on the facts of the instant case, the “cause of action” accrued.

        As already noted, in response to Complainant’s letter dated 04.07.1994, the Courier informed them that one Anil Sharma, an employee of the Complainant, had taken delivery of the consignment on 11.06.1994. In unequivocal terms they told the Complainant that having delivered the goods on production of GR and payment of cargo charges, they had no liability qua the subject consignment. In so far as the Courier was concerned, for them the matter stood closed on the date of delivery. It is evident from the Complainant’s letters dated 04.08.1994 and 12.08.1994 (extracted above) that the substratum of their complaint against the Courier was “delivery of goods to an unauthorised person” viz. Anil Sharma and not the delivery at all. In this regard, it would be useful to reproduce paragraph 9 of the complaint filed by the Complainant with the State Commission.

       It is clear from the afore-extracted averment in the complaint and letters written by the Complainant to the Courier that “cause of action” on the basis of which the complaint was filed, was the alleged default on the part of the Courier in allegedly delivering the goods to Anil Sharma. Hence, the “cause of action” arose on that date and the period of limitation for the purpose of Section 24-A of the Act began to run from 11.06.1994. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the Complainant gained knowledge of delivery of consignment to Anil Sharma only on the receipt of letter dated 13.07.1994 from the Courier, even then the complaint having been filed on or after 12.08.1996 was clearly barred by time.

       We are convinced that on facts at hand the complaint preferred by the Complainant on 12.08.1996, was clearly barred by limitation and in the absence of an application for condonation of delay in filing the same in terms of Sub-Section (2) of Section 24-A of the Act, it could not be admitted for adjudication. We are conscious of the observations of the Supreme Court in V.N. Shrikhande’s case (Supra) that before dismissing the complaint as time-barred, an opportunity of hearing should be given to the Complainant, who can seek condonation of delay under Section 24-A (2) of the Act by showing that there was sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the prescribed time. However, neither in the written submissions filed by the Complainant nor during the course of hearing such a prayer was made as the Complainant still believes that the cause of action arose only on 12.08.1994, when the Courier was threatened of legal action by them. Therefore, the question of grant of an opportunity to the Complainant to seek condonation of delay in filing the complaint does not arise. In view of our above conclusion, it is unnecessary to deal with the questions relating to territorial jurisdiction or the quantum of compensation. In the result, both the appeals are allowed, the impugned order of the State Commission is set aside and the complaint is dismissed. No costs. (Paras 17 to 24)