IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Law of Limitation – The law of limitation applies equally to private parties and Government bodies; the State cannot claim a separate period of limitation or special treatment merely on the grounds of “impersonal machinery” or “inherited bureaucratic methodology.”
(2) Application for condonation of delay – The object of the Consumer Protection Act is the speedy disposal of disputes, and condoning a huge delay of 268 days without valid justification would defeat the letter and spirit of the Act. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay is rejected, and the appeal is dismissed in limine as time-barred.

ORDER

The present first appeal has been filed under Section 51 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 by the appellant/opposite parties being aggrieved of the order dated 06.09.2024, passed by the learned Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula (for short the ‘State Commission’) in Consumer Complaint No. 86 of 2017.

2. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties on the delay condonation application being IA/10221/2025 and the reply filed against that.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the delay was caused, for the reason that the appellant is a Government body and it took time to get the approvals at different levels. The bureaucratic structure, along with necessary scrutiny further contributed for the delay. The delay was a procedural delay only and it is not deliberate or intentional. Hence, the delay may be condoned.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132, Esha Bhattacharjee V. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 and Navdeep Joh Aguiar Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Anr. Revision Petition No. 235 of 2023 decided on 23.08.2023.

5. Contrary to it, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent is a 72 years old person retired from the Army. He is fighting for his rights since the year 2017. He further submitted that the reasons / grounds for condonation of delay given in the delay condonation application are not sufficient enough to condone the delay as there can be no separate procedure for the Government bodies. Furthermore, no specific details have been given where and for what purpose and how much time was consumed.

6. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon (1) Shivamma (Dead) by LRs Vs. Karanataka Housing Board & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 11794 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10704 of 2019) decided on 12.09.2025; (2) Chief Post Master General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. Civil Appeal No.2474 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP (c) Nos.7595-96 of 2011) decided on 24.02.2012 and (3) Huda & Anr. Vs. Sandeep Kumar & Anr., Revision Petition No. 1446 of 2010 decided on 05.10.2016.

7. Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record.

8. The Registry has reported that there is a delay of 268 days, while the appellant has mentioned a delay of 206 days.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant has taken the main ground for condonation of delay that the appellant is a Government body and the delay was caused in seeking approvals at different levels. It was also submitted that the delay was a procedural delay only and it was not intentional or deliberate.

10. In the application for condonation of delay, no specific dates or period has been mentioned to establish that at what level and for what time the approvals/permissions remained pending. The reasons given and submissions made are not convincing and sufficient enough to condone a huge delay of 268 days. Such a huge delay cannot be condoned, merely for the reason that the appellant is a Government body. In the recent judgement Shivamma (Dead) by LRs Vs. Karanataka Housing Board & Ors. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid as under:—

“261. .......Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer th