1990 Supreme(Guj) 60
Gujarat High Court
Judgename :K. J. VAIDYA, S. B. MAJMUDAR
HIRABHAI NANUBHAI DESAI - Appellant
Versus
STATE - Respondent
S.C.A. 387 of .
Decided On : 04/26/1990
Headnote:
Constitution of India – Arts. 226 and 227 – Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 – Rules 213 229 233 293 – Motor Vehicles Act 1988 – Sec. 174 175 176 – Code of Civil Procedure 1908 – Order 21 Rule 54 – Motor Vehicles Act 1939 – Sec. 110 110e 110 and 111a – The Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959 – Rules 294 310 – Representation of the People Act 1951 – Sec. 90 (2) – Bombay Court Fees Act – Art. 1 of Schedule I – Motor Vehicle Rules – S.C.A – Two important questions of law arising for our consideration in this petition are as under : (I) Whether Rule 233 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 is ultra vires Sec. 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 ? (ii) Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (of 1939 or 1988 of the case may be) has got powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for enforcement and execution of its award i. e. whether which Claims Tribunal can be called or equated with Court and can execute an award like a decree? – Held, Court accordingly hold that (i) Rule 233 of Rules 1989 is intra vires Sec. 174 of Act 1988 and (ii) that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the provisions of Act 1988 is a Court for all intents and purposes including enforcement of its award and therefore can exercise powers under Sec. 47 and Order at Civil Procedure Code 1908 and that what is barred by Sec. 175 of Act 1988 is the jurisdiction of Civil Court and not the procedure to be applied under Civil Procedure Code – Order Accordingly
( 1 ) TWO important questions of law arising for our consideration in this petition are as under : (I) Whether Rule 233 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules 1989 is ultra vires Sec. 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 ? (ii) Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (of 1939 or 1988 of the case may be) has got powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for enforcement and execution of its award i. e. whether which Claims Tribunal can be called or equated with Court and can execute an award like a decree ?. . . . . . . . .
( 2 ) NOW in order to answer the aforesaid two question it is necessary first of all to have a look at the facts of the case and then to closely examine and scan the relevant scheme and provisions of the raid Motor Vehicles Act and Rules made thereunder2. 1 Facts One Bhartiben Dilipbhai Kothari (for short respondent- claimant) had submitted an application for compensation under Sec. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 same being M. A. C. Petition No. 283 of 1988 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-IV (Main) Ahmedabad against three opponents (i) Kalpesh Khodidas Patel (respondent No 4 herein); (ii) Haribhai Nagjibhai Desai (petitioner- judgment-debtor); and (iii) The National Insurance Co Ltd. Ahmedabad (respondent No 3 herein) praying for a compensation to the tune of Rs. 50 0 for her alleged leg injury in a vehicular accident According to the respondent-claimant on 3/10/1953 at about 15-30 hours when she was returning home the respondent No 4 came from Usmanpura wide rashly and negligently driving the motor-cycle bearing No GRL 8687 belonging to the petitioner herein and dashed against her causing a fracture on her left side. There proceedings terminated ultimately into a judgment and award dated 26/06/1989 in her favour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 2 Thereafter it appears that since the judgment-debtor tiled to comply with the said award the respondent-claimant was constrained to file Execution Applications Darkhast No. 25 of 1916 on 23/12/1916 before the Tribunal for the enforcement of the same. Ultimately the Tribunal was pleased to pass the following order; further ORDER notice under Order 21 Rule 14 is served Notice under Order 21 Rule 66 is also served No objection has been filed by other side. Hence attached property to be sold and Darkhast ordered to be sent to C. T. A. for further proceedings according to law. 4 Sd/- R. P. Dholakia m. A. C. T (IV) (A ).
( 3 ) FOOLING aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and order the petitioner who happens to be one of the two judgment- debtors has filed the present petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
( 4 ) MR. Ashok Padiya the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner while challenging the impugned order has raised two contentions referred to in the first paragraph of this judgment. In order to make good his submissions Mr. Padiya first of all took us to the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules made thereunder as far as they are relevant to decide the controversy in the present case. Incidentally it may be mentioned that of late in the year 1988 the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 has been replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 and relevant Rules made thereunder namely The Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules 1959 have been replaced by the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rule. 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act 1939 or Act 1988 and Rules 1959 or Rules 1989 as the case may be ). Briefly it is to be noticed that Secs. 110e 110 and 111a of the Act 1939 correspond to Secs. 174. 175 and 176 of the Act 1988 Thus Sec 110e of the Act 1939 which corresponds to Sec. 174 of the Act 1988 pertains to the recovery of money from insurer as arrears of land revenue. Section 110f of the Act 1939 which corresponds to Sec 175 of the Act 1988 pertains to bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts Section 111a of the Act