( 1 ) FOR himself for R. K. ABICHANDANI, j. (Majority view) : The question that stands referred to us, as a Full Bench, for our consideration and answer, runs as follows: "whether the cases for the offences punishable under Chapters XVI and XVII of the I. P. C. and Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959, pending investigation can be taken into consideration for arriving at the subjective satisfaction as to whether a person is a dangerous person within the meaning of Sec. 2 (c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985?" the need for the reference arose, because, B. S. Kapadia and N. J. Pandya, jj. , who have made the reference, found themselves not in a position to agree with the view of the Bench of C. V. Jani and (one of us), S. D. Dave, JJ. , in shamjibhai Manjibhai Patel v. Commissioner of Police, City of Ahmedabad and anr. , 1992 (2) XXXIII (2) GLR 1360. wherein it was opined :". . . . . . . . . it shall have to be accepted that the detaining authority could not have utilised the registration of the abovesaid 4 Criminal Cases against the petitioner-detenu, because at the relevant time they were all under investigation. "the Bench, in Shamjibhai Manjibhai Patel v. Commissioner of Police, City of ahmedabad and Am. , 1992 (2) XXXIII (2) GLR 1360, followed the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Abdul Razak Nannekhan Pathdn v. Police Commissioner, ahmedabad and Anr. , 1990 (2) GLH 137 (SC ). The relevant passage occurring therein and followed by the Bench in Shamjibhai Manjibhai Patel v. Commissioner of Police, city of Ahmedabad and Anr. , 1992 (2) XXXIII (2) GLR 1360, runs as follows :". . . . . . . . . Merely on consideration of the other three criminal cases, which are under investigation and are yet to be decided the detaining authority cannot come to this subjective satisfaction that the detenu was a dangerous person who habitually indulges in committing offences referred to in Sec. 2 (c) of PASA Act. "if the passage in Abdul Razak Nannekhan Pathan v. Police Commissioner, ahmedabad and Anr. , 1990 (2) GLH 137 (SC) is a ratio decidendi of law in the pronouncement, then, this Court, in the absence of any other binding pronouncement of the Apex Court, will have to follow it. The ratio decidendi must be of law, for, even a finding of fact in this sense would be the ratio decidendi. The facts of ratio decidendi have been summarised by dias on Jurisprudence, Fourth Edition, in the following terms :". . . What is "law" in a precedent is its ruling or ratio decidendi and this concerns future litigants as well as those involved in the immediate dispute. Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. Three shades of meaning can be attached to the expression "ratio decidendi". The first, which is the translation of it, is "the reason for (or of) deciding". Even a finding of fact may in this sense be the ratio decidendi. Thus, a Judge may state a rule and then decide that the facts do not fall within it. Secondly, it may mean "the rule of law proffered by the Judge as the basis of his decision", or, thirdly, it may mean "the rule of law which others regard as being of binding authority. " salmond on Jurisprudence, Twelfth Edition, spoke as to how far a ratio decidendi in a pronouncement is conclusive as follows :". . . . . . As against persons not parties to the suit, the only part of a case which is conclusive (with the exception of cases relating to status) is the general rule of law for which it is authority. This rule or proposition, the ratio decidendi, may be described roughly as the rule of law applied by and acted on by the Court, or the rule which the Court regarded as governing the case. . . "the eminent author recapitulated the tests, one of Professor Wambaugh and another of Dr. Goodhart. The test promulgated by Professor Wambaugh, as per extract found in the above Edition, runs as follows :". . . The reversal test of Prof