( 1 ) A Division Bench, by its order dated 23rd June, 1994, has referred the question as to whether petitions, against an order of the Tribunal under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the act"), when purported to be filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, in conjunction with Art. 227 or otherwise, and where a writ in the nature of Certiorari is prayed for, are maintainable, for consideration of the Larger Bench in view of the two decisions of this Court cited before it on behalf of the respondent-State in himatlal K. Parekh v. Competent Authority and Deputy Collector (ULC), Rajkot and anr. , 1990 (1) GLH 446:[1990 (1) GLR 626], and in Jashubhai Hiralal Gandhi v. Competent Authority and Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad and Ors. , 1990 (2) GLH 609 : [1990 (2) GLR 1140]. Relying on these decisions, a contention was urged that an order passed by the Tribunal under the said Act can only be challenged under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, a Letters Petent Appeal was not maintainable against orders passed by a single Judge of this Court in such matters.

( 2 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28th April, 1994 of the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 2339 of 1990; (reported in 1994 (2) GLR 1564) in a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, questioning the correctness of the various orders, including an order passed by the Urban Land Tribunal at Ahmedabad (respondent no. 3 in the petition) on 28th December, 1988 in Appeal No. Rajkot 49 of 1986. By the said appellate order, the order issued by the Competent Authority, declaring the holding of the appellant to be in excess of the ceiling limit by 54,886. 44 sq. metres was affirmed. The learned single Judge held that the appellant, by virtue of his conduct, had become disentitled from claiming any relief under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It appears from the Judgment of the learned single Judge that the petition was treated as a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

( 3 ) UNDER Sec. 33 of the said Act, a person, aggrieved by an order made by the Competent Authority under the Act, not being an order under Sec. 11, or subsection (1) of Sec. 30, can prefer an appeal within the prescribed time to the appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority is empowered to entertain the appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period of 30 days, if sufficient cause is shown for the delay. Under sub-section (2) of Sec. 33, the Appellate Authority is empowered to make orders as it deems fit in such Appeals, after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard. It is clear from the provisions of Sec. 33 that the Appellate Authority exercises judicial functions. Respondent No. 3-Urban land Tribunal was the Appellate Authority, constituted under the provisions of sec. 33 of the Act, and it has passed the order, after hearing the parties and after recording reasons therein, dismissing the appeal of the appellant on 28th December, 1988, at Annexure d to the petition. From the nature of powers conferred on the said Urban Land Tribunal and the manner in which such powers are required to be exercised, it is obvious that the Tribunal exercises judicial functions.

( 4 ) IN Himatlals case (supra), the Division Bench was considering the question whether Letters Patent Appeal would lie against an order of the single Judge, in a writ petition filed against the decision of the Tribunal, given in an appeal under sec. 33 of the said Act. It appears that the writ petition was filed under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench, while holding that the urban Land Tribunal at any rate exercised quasi-judicial powers, if not judicial powers while deciding such appeals under Sec. 33 of the Act, held as under :-". . . . Whatever label be attached to the petitions challenging the le